Bell and banner: Armenian revolutionaries at the end of the Ottoman Empire by Stebbins, Jeffrey W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-12
Bell and banner: Armenian revolutionaries at the end
of the Ottoman Empire
Stebbins, Jeffrey W.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
BELL AND BANNER: ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARIES 








 Thesis Advisor: Ryan Gingeras 
 Second Reader: Abbas Kadhim 






















REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Bell and Banner: Armenian Revolutionaries at the End 
of the Ottoman Empire 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR: Jeffrey W. Stebbins 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This study begins by addressing the political, social, and economic conditions in the Ottoman Empire in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to provide the historical context for the emergence of Armenian 
revolutionaries. It then details the attempts at reforming the empire by the Tanzimat and Hamidian regimes, the effect 
these reforms had on social and economic conditions for provincial Ottoman Armenians, and the steps those within 
the empire but especially among the Armenian diaspora took to adopt revolutionary tactics in attempting to alleviate 
conditions in the Armenian fatherland. Specific attention will be paid to the programs and activities of the major 
parties that have comprised the Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Dashnaktsutiun, the Hunchaks, and the 
Armenakans. This study then reviews revolutionary activity amidst the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
particularly the Dashnaktsutiun who were most active during this period, in an effort to complete a survey of 
Armenian revolutionary activity. Finally, it concludes with general observations regarding the process by which some 
Armenians, who had at one point been considered the Ottoman Empire’s “loyal millet,” decided to arm themselves 






14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Armenian Revolutionaries, Dashnaktsutiun, Dashnak, Hunchak, Armenakan, Armenian Terrorism   
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
125 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii






















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
BELL AND BANNER: ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARIES 
AT THE END OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
Jeffrey W. Stebbins 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.A., St. Michael’s College, 1993 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Daniel Moran, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This study begins by addressing the political, social, and economic conditions in the 
Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to provide the 
historical context for the emergence of Armenian revolutionaries. It then details the 
attempts at reforming the empire by the Tanzimat and Hamidian regimes, the effect these 
reforms had on social and economic conditions for provincial Ottoman Armenians, and 
the steps those within the empire but especially among the Armenian diaspora took to 
adopt revolutionary tactics in attempting to alleviate conditions in the Armenian 
fatherland. Specific attention will be paid to the programs and activities of the major 
parties that have comprised the Armenian Revolutionary Movement: the Dashnaktsutiun, 
the Hunchaks, and the Armenakans. This study then reviews revolutionary activity 
amidst the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress, particularly the Dashnaktsutiun 
who were most active during this period, in an effort to complete a survey of Armenian 
revolutionary activity. Finally, it concludes with general observations regarding the 
process by which some Armenians, who had at one point been considered the Ottoman 
Empire’s “loyal millet,” decided to arm themselves first in self-defense in pursuit of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study will provide an historical study of the Armenian revolutionary 
movement in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Efforts by organizations 
within the movement to adopt a revolutionary path in pursuit of Armenian autonomy 
within the Ottoman state have included both non-violent participation in the political 
process as well as alternative measures that have included terrorism. As one of the first 
revolutionary movements in modern Middle Eastern history, it is essential to identify 
who the Armenians revolutionaries were, what strategies they adopted and why they 
adopted them, as well as the historical context in which these strategies were employed. 
This work, it is hoped, will provide conclusions derived from an historical survey of the 
basic conditions that fostered the adoption of violence by a revolutionary group in 
achieving their political objectives which attempted to address worsening conditions for 
provincial Ottoman Armenians.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In reviewing the emergence and development of Armenian revolutionaries, 
several questions demand attention: What challenges did the Ottoman Empire face during 
its decline? What was the effect of Ottoman reform (in response to these challenges) on 
the empire’s religious minorities, particularly upon rural Armenians? What impact did 
changes in the Ottoman government at the beginning of the twentieth century have on the 
efforts of Armenian revolutionaries? In answering these questions, certain conclusions 
may be drawn regarding this study’s central question: What were the social, economic, 
and political conditions within the Ottoman Empire that prompted revolutionary activity, 
specifically, the adoption of terrorism?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
There are many states today that maintain a contentious relationship with ethnic 
minorities within their borders. As violence and terror have been used by some of these 
groups in the past to varying degrees of success, it is important to understand what 
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conditions existed that brought them to adopt a revolutionary stance in general, and 
violence in particular, in achieving their political goals.  
A review of the origins and evolution of the Armenian revolutionary parties, their 
political strategies and what these strategies attempted to accomplish under the rule of 
different Ottoman governments is pertinent to geopolitical circumstances today that 
involve states and their ethnic minorities. The importance of the relationships between 
the ethnic and religious minorities and the states by whom they are governed cannot be 
understated; it threatens the region’s stability to this day. 
One of the first revolutionary movements in the Middle East was the Armenian 
revolutionary movement. A review of the evolution of the Armenian revolutionary parties 
provides a telling narrative which may provide comparison to the region’s revolutionary 
groups today. The circumstances under which this movement was formed provide a 
historical context for examining revolutionary emergence during the Ottoman Tanzimat 
era and the Armenian reaction to the dissolution of the millet system as well as the 
pivotal decrees issued by the sultan’s government in 1839 and 1856. During this period, 
there occurred significant changes in the manner in which groups such as the Armenians 
were administered, as the government moved from an ideology based on religion to a 
more secular Ottomanism.  
Armenian hopes for improved governance hinged on the implementation of a 
constitution after the failure of both the Hatt-i Sherif (the 1839 reforms) and the Hatt-i 
Humayun (the 1856 decree) to improve conditions in Ottoman Armenia. Conditions for 
Armenians continued to worsen under Ottoman prejudices against non-Muslims and 
fostered a policy of inequality toward Armenians in the region. This policy was manifest 
in such practices as forbidding Armenians the right to bear arms; maintaining taxation 
practices that were more burdensome for Armenians than for Muslims; failure to provide 
protection from hostile tribes that bordered Armenian areas; forbidding Armenians to 
serve in the military; and restricting Armenian involvement in legal proceedings.1  
                                                 
1 Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political 
Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 25–26.  
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Armenian nationalist sentiments eventually took root in Ottoman Armenia due to 
frustration fed from a lack of reform and continued ambivalence,2 as well as in response 
to encouragement of Armenian persecution at the behest of the Ottoman state.3 As 
nationalism continued to grow throughout the Armenian population, however, Sultan 
Abdulhamid II ignored the constitution and the western liberties it contained. For the 
Armenians, life under the Hamidian government was a struggle for survival under a 
constant fear of attack or displacement. The establishment of the Hamidiye, a Kurdish 
cavalry that constantly threatened Armenian areas with plunder and terror, was sponsored 
by the sultan and it was estimated this force grew to 30,000, operating in areas where 
there was little civil authority.4 The sultan’s promotion of Pan-Islamism reconciled 
differences among Sunni Kurds, those constituting the majority, and brought them back 
into his favor.5 Further plaguing the social climate in Armenian areas was the arrival of 
muhajirs from the Caucuses and the sultan’s policy of settling these people among the 
Armenians which led to “Armenian insecurity of life and property.”6  
Armenian hopes of any reform by the Ottoman government were further 
diminished under the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). With an ideology that 
promoted the Turkification of the population of the Ottoman empire, and amid growing 
Muslim discontent with equality guaranteed to Ottoman Christians, the CUP would do 
little to improve life in Armenian areas. In fact, perhaps the most horrific slaughter and 
deportations of the modern age began in 1915 under its charge. But even before such 
genocide was undertaken, measures had been instituted to derail Armenian political 
activity in the form of a “law of associations” which “forbade the formation of political 
associations linked to non-Turkish ethnic or national goals.”7 Despite efforts by the 
                                                 
2 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of 
the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 50. 




7 Ibid., 62. 
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Dashnaks to change the CUP platform to one significantly less prejudiced against 
minority groups such as the Armenians, plans for the great tragedy that was to befall the 
Armenians and effectively end their revolutionary activity against the Ottomans were 
already underway, though whether this was during the 1910 or 1911 congress is still 
disputed.8 
The story of the Armenian revolutionaries is significant in that it provides an 
overview of one of the first revolutionary groups in the Middle East whose struggle for 
an improved life for the population they represented was met with contention from a state 
that was itself struggling for survival. In hindsight, the goals of the Armenians and those 
of the Ottoman state do not seem mutually exclusive; value remains in an examination of 
the courses taken by both.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Armenian nationalism has a tendency to dominate the literature concerning the 
development of the Armenian revolutionary movement and conflates an already sensitive 
subject: the discussion of Armenian genocide. Armenian revolutionary political strategies 
were supported with the hopes that Armenian nationalism would appeal to the greater 
Armenian population from which it would garner support and an international audience 
from which an external partner would emerge to help the revolutionaries establish self-
rule. But nationalism seems to have appealed more to an Armenian intelligentsia than to 
the masses it was meant to inspire. This is a problem that is further explained in the 
following literature review. 
The “problem” posed by the genocide discussion stems from an insistence from 
the Turkish point of view that, at best, it was a means of the government to deal with 
insurrection within its borders, and, at worst, that it never occurred. Armenians, of 
course, adhere to a distinctly different belief in that it is one of the greatest human  
 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
 5
tragedies of the modern era. Both sides are unbending in their beliefs and it is not likely 
to change in the near future. The challenge, then, is finding objective evidence on which 
to base conclusions. 
From an historiographical point of view, the issue becomes finding sources which 
consider an integrated narrative of both Turks and Armenians: “The problem, simply 
phrased, is that historians and others who have tried to tell the story of Turkish/Armenian 
relations toward the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been unable 
to imagine a common history, one that accounts for the complexities each found in its 
situation and the areas where common thought and action evolved.”9 This study will 
attempt to include those areas of commonality among Armenians and Turks. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Against a backdrop wrought with death on a truly awesome scale, this study will 
provide an historical survey of the Armenian revolutionary movement, with a focus on 
the means they adopted in advancing their political interests.10 A historical review of 
these organizations’ efforts of attaining an autonomous Armenian state have included 
both non-violent participation in the political process as well as alternative measures that 
have included violence and terrorism. This study will consolidate the history of Armenian 
revolutionaries that can be found in work on subjects such as the Armenian genocide, 
Armenian nationalism, Ottomanism, and Pan-Islamism, as well as those that deal 
exclusively with Armenian revolutionary groups during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. It is essential to review precisely what was intended by these early 
                                                 
 9 For an excellent and recent work of the general nature of Armenian revolutionaries see Gerard J. 
Libaridian, “What Was Revolutionary about Armenian Revolutionary Parties in the Ottoman Empire?” in A 
Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, et 
al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 86. 
10 Several excellent works provide the historical context on which this study relies: Karen Barkey, 
Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); M. Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008); and Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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revolutionaries in understanding their original tendencies toward violence and occasional 
focus on participation in legitimate political processes.  
1. Revolutionary Origins 
It is necessary to trace the origins of these revolutionaries within a greater, more 
general national conscience, to include the movement’s origins and evolution, and the 
manner in which it chose to deal with the Ottoman state. Originally conceived in the 
summer of 1890, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was a loose collaboration 
among several Armenian groups, principal among them the Dashnaktsutiun, but also the 
Hunchaks, and to a lesser extent, the Armenakans, in order to provide a somewhat united 
political entity that would represent Armenians within the Ottoman state.11 Dissention 
within the party quickly brought about a split into what would become the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF), known as the Dashnaktsutiun (or, simply the 
Dashnaks), and the Hunchak Revolutionary Party, or the Social Democratic Hunchakian 
Party (SDHP) (or simply, the Hunchaks).12 This divide would have enduring effects on 
the Armenian revolutionary movement experiencing failure where a unified party might 
have succeeded. Indeed, a point of contention is the extent to which each of these parties 
was able to exert its influence over the Armenian population and the extent to which they 
constituted a threat to the Ottoman regime.13 From its inception, and as outlined in its 
program of the Dashnaks, there was an inclination toward violence by which the party 
would obtain its objective of “the political and economic freedom of Turkish 
Armenia…”14 Included in the Program was language that is not easily confused: “To 
stimulate fighting and to terrorize government officials, informers, traitors, usurers, and 
every kind of exploiter.”15 Such sentiment was indicative of the revolutionary nature of 
both the Dashnak and Hunchak party, but the differences between the two are important 
                                                 
11 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 151. 
12 Ibid, 164. 
13 Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1896,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, July 1982. 24:3, 493. 
14 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 167. 
15 Ibid. 
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for a full understanding of the former, especially if the distinction is to be made between 
pursuit of political objectives by non-violent and violent means and the lengths to which 
violence was pursued. A comprehensive and widely referenced historical narrative 
concerning the origins of the Armenian Revolutionary Movement is included in the 
cornerstone of Armenian revolutionary literature in The Armenian Revolutionary 
Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth 
Century by Louise Nalbandian. 
2. Party Differences 
The Dashnaks and the Hunchaks differed primarily in their political goals and 
their geographic interests. The central political goal of the Dashnaks was the 
establishment of an autonomous, distinctly Armenian territory within the Ottoman state.16 
The implementation of imperial reforms was the immediate concern for the betterment of 
all Ottoman Armenians. Conversely, the Hunchaks advocated the institution of a 
separate, independent Armenian state.17 Ideologically, the Dashnaks and Hunchaks did 
not differ significantly in their adoption of socialism as a framework through which to 
change the nature of a society that constituted “the exploited and exploiter classes of 
society and…the need to do away with bourgeois capitalist-usurers.”18 Significant 
differences did result on how big the role of socialism should play in the program. 
Another principal difference was where such change would take place: the Dashnaks 
focused on Ottoman Armenia and the Hunchaks on Armenians in the Ottoman, Russian 
and Persian Empires.19 While these differences related the official divides between the 
two parties, much of the split was likely due to intraparty rivalry and resentment.20  
                                                 
16 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 169; Libaridian, “Armenian Revolutionary 
Parties,” 90. 
17 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 169. 
18 Ibid., 170. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 172. 
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3. Nationalism, Ottomanism, and Panturism 
Where socialism was sufficient to launch the political aspirations of Armenian 
revolutionaries, it did little to mobilize support of the larger Armenian population. 
Instead, there occurred a shift to inspire the masses of Armenians along nationalist lines. 
Herein is found the true nature of a people disenchanted by the yoke of imperialism: “The 
point was to turn subjects into citizens.”21 It was at this point, then, that the imperial 
traditional practices, such as the use of millets, transformed peoples from those who were 
governed according to religious dictate to nations who were organized politically.22 This 
was accomplished primarily by a reconstitution of the Armenian identity: where once 
there had existed separate religious sects composed of Armenians, there now was a 
consolidated ethnic group that could foster political progress. 23 This, then, was the birth 
of Armenian nationalism which would become the impetus behind future Armenian 
revolutionary activity.24 While such nationalist sentiments spread among Armenians, the 
target of such sentiment remained the inability of the Ottoman state to deliver basic 
political goods, especially security.25 
Nationalism served to unite Armenians against a regime that could not guarantee 
their security or prosperity. Indeed, the deteriorating security conditions in Armenian 
areas and the lack of an appropriate response by those in power at the time, the Tanzimat 
and then the Hamidian regime, promoted the conception of the Dashnaks as a 
revolutionary party.26 The shift to nationalism from the religiously organized millet 
system is included among works dealing with Armenian revolutionaries in the context of 
                                                 
21 Libaridian, “Armenian Revolutionary Parties,” 98. 
22 Ibid., 86. 
23 Ibid., 87. 
24 For an ideological overview that includes the emergence of Armenian nationalism in both the 
Ottoman and Russian states see Anaide Ter Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian 
Revolutionary Movement (1887–1912) (Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1984). See also J. Michael 
Hagopian, “Hyphenated Nationalism: The Spirit of the Revolutionary Movement in Asia Minor and the 
Caucasus, 1896 – 1910,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1942). 
25 See Dikran M. Kaligian, “A Prelude to Genocide: CUP Population Policies and Provincial 
Insecurity, 1908–1914,” Journal of Genocide Research 10:1 (2008).  
26 Ibid. 
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Armenian nationalism.27 The dissolution of a system in which church leaders governed 
their respective areas allowed for the emergence of Armenian revolutionary parties as the 
dominant political actors.  
The focus of the literature that covers Armenian nationalism is varied. Indeed, as 
Reynolds correctly suggests, “the theme of nationalism and its development has been 
allowed to overshadow other processes, and its uncritical application has proven 
deleterious to our understanding of history.”28 Armenian nationalism is important to our 
understanding of the development of revolutionary political strategy but it is not in and of 
itself a sufficient explanation for the adoption of violent or nonviolent means. Reynolds, 
among others,29 considers nationalism in a broader context rather than as a simple 
Panturanic explanation for Ottoman persecution of Armenian revolutionaries.30  
4. Political Strategies 
With growing discontent in Ottoman Armenian areas, and the unifying factor of 
Armenian nationalism, the challenge then became what methods to adopt to achieve the 
Dashnak goal of an autonomous Armenian region. The Dashnaks realized very early on 
that they would not have enough military strength or experience to defeat the Ottomans 
by themselves, a critical juncture that forced an appeal to international allies. They would 
thus look both within Ottoman borders and to the wider international community for 
support of their plight.  
The Ottoman government, other ethnic and religious minorities, and wealthy 
Armenians served as targets of political strategies that involved political petition, multi-
                                                 
27 Donald Bloxham, “Terrorism and Imperial Decline: The Ottoman-Armenian Case,” European 
Review of History 14:3 (2007), 304; Ronald Grigor Suny, “Empire and Nation: Armenians, Turks, and the 
End of the Ottoman Empire,” Armenian Forum 12:2 (1998), 23. For an excellent and comprehensive work 
on most political, economic, and social aspects of minorities in the Ottoman Empire see Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982). 
28 Michael A. Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First World War 
and the Myth of Panturanism,” Past and Present 203 (2009), 137. 
29 See Bloxham, “Terrorism and Imperial Decline”; Kaligian, “A Prelude to Genocide”; Suny, 
“Empire and Nation.” 
30 See Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren.”  
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ethnic alliances, and fraternal sponsorship, respectively, of a non-violent nature.31 In 
response to the security situation in Armenian regions, the Dashnaks tried time and again 
to petition the Ottoman government for improvement in their conditions, particularly 
security from exploitation by neighboring ethnic populations.32 A second tactic was an 
attempted alliance with such traditionally hostile populations as the Kurds in an effort to 
unite disenfranchised Ottomans in providing a united opposition. 33 Lastly, the Armenian 
revolutionaries appealed to their own wealthy members for patronage.34 Similar peaceful 
appeals were projected abroad to European and even Russian powers in an attempt to 
appeal to the Universalist and enlightenment ideals that brought about the French 
Revolution.35 But such attempts were largely in vain and the impatience of the Dashnaks 
fostered a tendency toward violence in search of immediate progress toward autonomy. 
The hope that fed Armenian revolutionary pursuit of international intervention is covered 
widely within the literature and remains important due to the fact that it helped in myriad 
ways to promote the Armenian revolutionary cause and to provide an easy explanation 
for an Ottoman campaign of persecution.36 
Political violence and terrorism were both used as means by which to intimidate a 
target audience in order to bring about an intended political result. But while many do not 
distinguish between political violence and terrorism, the difference between the two 
remains subtle.37 For the sake of this study, terrorism will include political violence, 
                                                 
31 Later demands for funds from wealthy Armenians, however, would involve extortion and violence 
as conditions in the provinces became more desperate. 
32 See Bloxham, “Terrorism and Imperial Decline,” 304 for conditions prior to 1890; Kaligian, “A 
Prelude to Genocide,” for a description of the Dashnak-led Congress of Ottoman Opposition Parties as well 
as a description of the deteriorating security conditions among the Armenian peoples from 1908–14; Suny, 
“Empire and Nation,” 37–8 for elected Armenian nationalists in Ottoman Parliament.  
33 Libaridian, “Armenian Revolutionary Parties,” 92. 
34 Khachig Tololyan, “Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 4:2 (1991), 11. 
35 Libaridian, “Armenian Revolutionary Parties,” 88, 100. 
36 See Jeremy Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878–1896 (London: Frank 
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which some define as attempts at specific political targets designed to intimidate those 
with influence to act a certain way. Terrorism more generally includes the indiscriminate 
threat or direct use of violence targeting innocents in order to attain political goals.  
Surveys of some of the violent methods and the justification for their use may be 
found within the literature about Armenian revolutionaries and offer some insight into 
specific incidents of terrorism and political violence, the distinction between the two,38 
and the association between the role of the Ottomans in the massacres of 1894-6, 1909, 
and 1915-6 and international intervention.39  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The analytical approach that will be undertaken is an historical study that will 
examine instances in which political strategies were employed by Armenian 
revolutionary parties and their predecessors from 1850 through the First World War. This 
evaluation will include a review of the goals that were promulgated, the strategies that 
were then used to achieve these goals; and historical accounts of the results of these 
efforts that reveal their effectiveness. This study will then provide general conclusions 
based on this method that will further the understanding of current ethnic and religious 
minority tensions that exist within states. 
This study will also rely on several works by Armenians that examine the 
revolutionary programs of the Dashnaks and Hunchaks, as well as accounts of the 
activities of Armenian revolutionary groups.40 These sources provide a greater 
understanding of who the Armenian revolutionaries were, their agenda, and the means by 
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which they hoped to accomplish their goals. They are available in English and constitute 
valuable historical material on which this study will rely.  
 13
II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: CHALLENGES AND REFORM 
The historical context from which Armenian revolutionaries emerged is one that 
spans approximately six hundred years and involves the rise and collapse of one of the 
greatest empires in world history. The intent of this chapter is to understand the 
preconditions for Armenian revolutionary activities. In order to understand the Armenian 
revolutionary movement, in particular its more violent manifestation, one must analyze 
and comprehend the challenges the Ottoman Empire faced during the 19th century. 
Furthermore, one must consider just as closely the reforms the Imperial government 
undertook as a means of responding to these challenges. Finally, deteriorating social 
conditions on the periphery of the empire must be reviewed as they were the result of 
state reformation failure and directly contributed to the emergence of Armenian 
revolutionaries.  
A. CHALLENGES TO IMPERIAL AUTHORITY: 1700–1839  
1. Decentralization 
Understanding the challenges the Ottoman Empire faced in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries requires a grasp of the manner in which the empire devolved from a 
state where power was effectively consolidated in a central authority to one in which 
influence gradually came to be held primarily at the local and provincial level. Two 
instruments that fostered this shift were tax farming and mercantilism in a European-
dominated global economy.41  
a. Tax Farming 
Tax farming became the instrument of state revenue collection and 
eventually evolved into an institution that, once privatized and established on the 
periphery, could not be converted to a centralized, public system of direct taxation.42 The 
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reasons for this include the size of the territory that required reforming, the reliance of 
those tax farmers in the provinces on the system, and the lack of a means by which the 
state could control the provinces.43 Before proceeding to how the system promoted 
decentralization within the Ottoman Empire, however, it is appropriate to first clarify 
what the term tax farming actually entailed. 
Tax farming was the privatization of tax collection. The state sold the 
rights to collect taxes to individuals whose initial investment also required them to submit 
an amount of revenue to the state.44 In order to meet the state’s demands for remittances, 
the tax farmer raised taxes in the locality for which he was responsible. Thus, the rights to 
tax farm were in high demand; the tax farmer was able to keep the revenue he collected 
after he submitted the required allotment to the appropriate state official. This system 
(iltizam) was administered by such state officials whose fixed-term contract allowed them 
to hire tax farmers as intermediaries to collect state monies.45 The nature of the system, 
then, promoted a tendency toward decentralization: the more taxes that had to be 
collected, the more contracts had to be issued, the more the state was required to loosen 
its grip on authority in such areas its control was marginal. Because various disputes and 
issues could and did arise in such a vast system, its oversight was proportional: “the 
Ottoman state regulated and assigned many different officials to supervise the workings 
of the system.”46 Except for a deprived peasantry, the system was profitable. The duration 
of the tax farming contracts changed significantly with the arrival of the milikane, which 
was a life-term tax farm awarded by the state to the highest bidder, though often sold to a 
collection of individuals who shared the expense and the spoils of a larger farm.47  
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The evolution of tax farming thus saw the creation of myriad relationships 
that allowed the dispersal of power farther away from Istanbul and into the provinces. 
New positions were created and a system of sub-letting contracts became common: 
The Istanbul tax farmers engaged as agents, sub tax farmers, and local tax 
collectors – between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals based in the provinces 
– constituted an entirely new web of state-provincial relations. The result 
was a gradual centrifugal expansion of contracts. Especially when central 
elites showed little interest in leases in the far eastern provinces of 
Anatolia (e.g., Damascus, Aleppo, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Adana), provincial 
notables in these regions were awarded contracts instead.48 
In such a manner, the state profited, at least initially, from its tax farm system. It also 
enjoyed a reciprocal relationship with the military elite who were among the first to 
participate in tax farming: the state favored them with such privilege, hoping this would 
engender loyalty, and the military assumed the financial risk inherent in the system in 
order to keep the state solvent.49 But as the system gained more and more participants at 
various intermediate levels between the state and its peasants, and interest in the 
provinces was maintained primarily by those who lived on the periphery, decentralization 
was inevitable: “Yet, the unintended by-product of such an extension of distributive 
privileges was that it allowed the provincials to develop their own new world.”50 The 
Ottoman institution of tax farming eventually contributed to decentralization within the 
empire.  
b. Mercantalism 
European mercantilism also played a significant role in further 
decentralizing the Ottoman Empire. Trading networks included widespread production 
locations, markets, and ports. As these bases became more established centers of 
commerce, their economic power tended to subvert that of Istanbul.51 Traders of other 
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nations also provided a means of exposure to different cultures and policies that 
eventually resulted in reorganization,52 pulling Ottoman subjects away from the center of 
the empire.  
The trading routes in the Indian Ocean were a source of wealth and luxury 
goods and, despite not being able to defeat the Portuguese, the loose Islamic network 
fostered by the Ottomans in this region proved profitable.53 The gradual shift to a more 
sedentary state in the fifteenth century had also allowed for the construction of permanent 
places of trade that would become large centers of commerce.54 The caravansary emerged 
as a place where people could bring goods from far away and sell them at profit. Trade, 
however, was well-regulated during the seventeenth century and one significant 
economic institution in the Ottoman empire was the practice of granting capitulations, or 
a grant in the ability to trade, to Europeans.55 These capitulations would have a 
significant role later in the history of the empire, particularly in the erosion of Ottoman 
power and subjects to European powers and Russia, and will be covered later in this 
study in a political context. With the Ottoman Empire still wielding significant influence 
in the region, however, the Europeans were forced to compete among each other for 
them. The capitulations also affected the state’s internal social composition wherein 
traders and providers became their own distinct groups within a greater Ottoman 
society.56 The former provided a means of expanding trade and tapping into new routes; 
the latter thrived under the state’s supervision and protection of this system of trade.57 
Most other Ottoman imperial economic institutions were ineffective in the seventeenth 
century and served to harass the lower class without significant increase in treasury 
levels.58 
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Much of the restructuring of the empire and the associated decentralization 
was due to the reinforcement of allegiances based on the goods that were traded, power 
positions among traders, and the manner in which the state handled trade expansion in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Raw materials were extracted and, after processing, 
became tradable goods which then had to be transported to an export or market 
location.59 At each of these steps in the production cycle, there was opportunity to 
interact and network with other entities engaged in similar activities.60 Trade thus 
transcended the borders of the empire bringing the influence of many different peoples to 
bear on Ottoman subjects and often resulting in strong bonds between them. Further 
decentralizing Ottoman authority was the power wielded by intermediaries in trade.61  
Those outside as well as within the empire relied on myriad people in 
positions of influence who facilitated trade at various ports and who themselves became a 
class of wealth and influence, but whose loyalty may not have centered on the state. 
Indeed, many in such positions represented the interests of not only themselves, but the 
various communities and entities they represented.62 The state, however, continued to 
exert its economic policy on the markets it tried to control. Such practices often resulted 
in corruption exacerbated at the local level which made trading more difficult.63 In the 
mid-eighteenth century when the balance of trade began to shift in favor of European 
powers, so too did attitudes among traders, producers and intermediaries in a similar 
direction.64 No longer was the Ottoman capital the only authority which had significant 
influence over economic actors within the empire: “As a result, the open, fluid, and far-
reaching networks of commercial activity could not endure, and they reorganized along 
communal, protectionist lines.”65 Power became decentralized in areas of trade such as 
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ports and markets, and wealth increasingly distributed among those doing the trading. 
States external to the Ottoman state also gained more and more influence as the Empire’s 
status among the world powers continued to decline.  
2. Loss of Economic Solvency 
Though commercialization and tax farming both had negative effects on the 
Ottoman economy in the eighteenth and into the nineteenth centuries, other factors 
contributed to the empire’s economic decline. From the disastrous siege of Vienna in 
1683 to the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt in 1789,66 the Ottoman empire both defended its 
territory and campaigned, most often unsuccessfully. These military actions, however, 
had to be funded and the empire did so at the expense of its people with increased taxes. 
Further straining Ottoman economic welfare was state control of land, poor fiscal policy, 
and inefficient industrial development. 
In order to fight the empire’s battles, materiel had to be bought; soldiers had to be 
paid, equipped, clothed, and fed; and transportation had to be purchased and maintained. 
In funding its martial necessities, the state adopted several dubious fiscal practices that 
served to place it farther into debt. It seized lands from its subjects, assumed substantial 
internal debt, and levied war taxes even in scarce periods of peace.67 War further added to 
Ottoman debt with the additional, and ever frequent, burden of reparations to the victor. It 
is estimated that in 1775 the Ottoman state was forced to forfeit half its budget to 
Russia.68 
Other policies were implemented in an effort to keep the state solvent. Ottoman 
provisionism, driven by the need to pay for war, led to most local production being 
diverted to war efforts.69 As a result, a great part of the production stayed within the 
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country and created a paucity of exports.70 With imports consisting mainly of scarce 
goods, an enormous trade deficit began to dominate the economy. A public purchasing 
policy allowed the government to set its own price for goods produced within the empire 
which was often well below market price and had disastrous results: “But this practice 
naturally led producers to cut supplies, lower quality, or even abandon the production of 
goods needed by the state.”71 These inefficiencies stood in stark contrast to 
manufacturing practices abroad that saw imports at competitive or even cheaper prices 
than domestically manufactured goods.72 Bankruptcy became rampant in the 
manufacturing sector.73 The Ottoman government was forced to borrow abroad or face 
the same fate as its domestic manufacturers.  
3. Great Power Political and Territorial Challenges 
The encroachment of the Great Powers on Ottoman politics and territorial 
integrity further burdened an already embattled empire. Capitulations, the permeation of 
western influence, and Western influence on the Ottoman administration was both direct, 
in the form of diplomatic pressures in the capital, and indirect, in the form of external 
pressures channeled through the millets. Capitulations had been in use since the sixteenth 
century74 and were a tool used by the Ottoman Empire to strengthen ties with countries 
and grant their merchants favorable trading conditions. The favor of the sultan inherent in 
the capitulations stipulated a protected status while conducting business in the empire, as 
they were subject only to the laws and taxes of their country of origin. In their original 
intent, these agreements were neither reciprocal nor were they as formal as a treaty: they 
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signified the favor with which the sultan held these foreign citizens, were granted at his 
whim, and could thus be rescinded just as quickly.75  
The name given by the Ottomans for these capitulations was imtiyazat or 
ahidname which carried the connotation of honor for an outsider.76 The term took on an 
entirely different meaning when the Ottoman Empire began to decline in strength while 
Europe’s influence and power increased. The Europeans recognized the situation for what 
it was – economic and political opportunity – and gradually abused the capitulations for 
their own ends, believing them to be their right, rather than a decree the sultan could 
rescind if “…the precondition of ‘friendship and sincerity had been broken.’”77 But the 
one-sided nature of the capitulations disappeared when they began to be included in 
treaties in hopes that both sides would discontinue abusing the system.78 In reality, 
however, the advantage these agreements provided shifted significantly to the Great 
Powers. An example of the manner in which the Great Powers were able to use the 
capitulations to their exclusive advantage was the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca signed with 
Russia in 1774. Articles VI and XIV of the treaty allowed Russia to make 
“representations” of members of the Greek Orthodox population within the Ottoman 
Empire.79 The effect of the treaty was devastating in its symbolism and implications. In 
essence, Catherine the Great subsumed all members of the Greek Orthodox community 
within the Ottoman Empire into Russian subjects. Ottoman dragomans working for 
Russian diplomats were given the same status which would eventually elevate them to 
intercessors between Ottoman bureaucrats and the Russian diplomatic mission.80 Having  
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assumed responsibility for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox population, article IX “provided 
Russia with opportunities and pretexts to interfere in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire 
whenever it saw fit.”81 
The lessons of diplomacy in the case of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca were not 
lost on the Ottomans but their status as a declining power in relation to the Great Powers 
left them scrambling in subsequent treaties to protect their population from essentially 
becoming citizens of other countries. The reality of the situation surely must have been 
apparent to Ottoman administrators, but their fate at this time was effectively intertwined 
with European policy: “Moreover, treaties were only as good as the ability of the Porte to 
enforce them and that became more and more difficult as the Ottoman Empire’s political 
and diplomatic dependence on Europe increased.”82 The beginning of the end of the 
Ottoman Empire had already begun; western influence would effectively continue to 
subvert the empire from within. 
Western influence had infiltrated the empire in myriad ways but of particular note 
is the manner in which the millets, including the Armenian millet, served as a conduit for 
western political and economic influence. Not only were European trading interests and 
diplomats challenging the Porte with western notions of change, the millet members with 
whom they were closely allied were critical in the delivery of western ideals as well, 
particularly through trade:  
The many millet members engaged in the import and export trade with 
European merchants often were given diplomatic passports or protection 
by European powers, and increased in numbers after 1774. In addition to 
bringing Western goods into the empire, they must certainly have 
introduced some Western business concepts and practices, and were 
probably aligned with Europeans in pressing the Porte for secular, 
Westernized commercial law and commercial courts.83 
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The concept of individual property rights in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the 
provinces, was non-existent; land was consistently subject to irregular taxation and 
outright seizure.84 Thus, a large portion of the populations in the millets were subject to 
unforeseen economic crises and displacement.  
Protection under a Great Power changed life considerably and for the better. If a 
subject of the millets was fortunate enough to work in some capacity for a foreign 
government, interpreters are one example provided by Issawi, they could avoid such 
difficulties in being granted or sold a berat from that government.85 This was but one 
element of a greater system, the “protégé system,” which allowed citizens of a foreign 
power to extend the rights of their homeland to Ottoman subjects, effectively 
circumventing stubborn Ottoman laws and conventions.86 This practice had profound 
effects among the empire’s minorities in that this became a legitimate goal of many that 
resulted in a loss of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman subjects (and associated tax 
revenue): “Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century Austria had two hundred 
thousand subjects in the Ottoman Empire.”87 But this system of foreign protection 
gradually changed so that the leaders of the millets, content with the status quo and less 
respondent to petition from those in the provinces, were often not sought by millet 
subjects to handle grievances. That role was now one that extended to those foreign 
nationals within the Ottoman empire: “By the middle of the nineteenth century foreign 
protection of minorities had greatly widened. Not only holders of berats but all aggrieved 
members of millets within reach of a foreign consul looked to him for protection and  
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redress.”88 The Great Powers were asserting a firmer hand in the affairs of the empire’s 
minorities, subverting the authority of the millet leadership in the center and, therefore, 
Ottoman control. 
There was also the influence of foreign non-state actors, specifically, those 
minorities and missionaries in the various diasporas in western Europe and Russia. The 
Christian minorities in the millets readily identified with these groups of the same 
religious persuasion who were willing to help. The assistance of these groups can be seen 
in two areas: trade and education.89 The advantages gained by the assistance of Christians 
outside the empire may seem obvious: business contacts fostered growth; new markets 
could be accessed; and different products could be brought to these markets. More 
substantial, however, was the development of educational opportunities for non-Muslims. 
Greater access to education for non-Muslims was often a direct result of the intervention 
of diasporas to build schools for those in the millets.90 It is appropriate to review some 
statistics that provide an educational comparison between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the empire. These numbers are provided by Charles Issawi: 
In the Ottoman Empire in 1896 there were 31,000 pupils in Muslim 
middle (rusdiye) schools, compared with 76,000 in non-Muslim and 7,000 
in foreign (the vast majority being non-Muslims), and 5,000 in secondary 
(idadiye) compared with 11,000 and 8,000. It is true that in elementary 
(ibtidaiye) schools Muslims far outnumbered the others, but the education 
received in them was of very little value. As early as the 1870s the Greeks 
in Istanbul alone had 105 schools with 15,000 pupils and the Armenians 
were not behind, frequenting in addition to their own schools those of the 
Catholic and Protestant missionaries. In Egypt the Greeks opened their 
first school in 1843 and soon had a wide network, Jewish schools, opened 
by immigrants from Europe, also date from the 1840s, and the Syrians and 
Armenians had theirs too.91 
Such evidence provides insight into one probable factor that contributed to the attitudes 
of Muslims toward the empire’s non-Muslim subjects that most probably provided a basis 
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for discrimination against them, particularly in areas in the provinces where the majority 
of landholders were Muslims, as was the case with many Armenians. 
In addition to the statesmen who developed western diplomatic contacts, were 
educated in the west, and whose exposure to the west surely influenced them in carrying 
out their duties to the Ottoman state, it is important to distinguish the manner in which 
one considers the millet as a medium that delivered western influence to Ottoman 
Muslims. Though one might consider the role of individual millet members as 
instruments of influence, or the influence certain religious aspects of millets had on 
Muslim subjects of the empire, this study will consider the millet as a “structural 
entity”.92 Politically, the Armenian millet served as a touchstone for western influence in 
the ever-changing Ottoman state of the nineteenth century 
4. The Rise of Nationalism(s) Within the Empire 
Nationalist movements within the empire also challenged Ottoman sovereignty. 
The emphasis had begun to shift in the eighteenth century, and more so in the nineteenth 
century, from identifying with one’s religion to identifying more with the ethnicity with 
which one was associated.93 Greeks, led by the Greek Orthodox Church in the Balkans, 
became, in essence, one of the first separatist challenges to the Ottoman state in the 
eighteenth century.94 But while it encompassed many ethnicities, it too became, along 
with the Ottoman state, an entity from which several ethnicities attempted to distance 
themselves in the nineteenth century.95 The nineteenth century then saw the emergence of 
several churches that represented separate, more distinct ethnicities, and would quickly 
give rise to nationalist tendencies. Such was the case with the Serbs in the 1830s; the 
Bulgarians in 1870; and Rumanians in 1885.96 
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Nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire, however, cannot be explained in its 
entirety with the emergence of ethnic churches. The Great Powers and a small number of 
ethnic separatists within their respective populations were in fact the forces behind 
nationalism. Indeed, rather than a grass roots movement spurred from the bottom up, the 
emergence of nationalism in the Balkan states was promoted by a small group of ethnic 
separatists whose political goals were impossible to implement within the Ottoman 
state.97 With help from the Great Powers, who hoped to use these nascent Balkan states 
to their own ends, these small groups were able to establish their own nation states.98 
The emergence of nationalism among the empire’s ethnic minorities and their 
successful attempts at establishing their own nation states proved disastrous for the 
Ottoman government. The very ideologies it had promoted as a means of consolidating 
its population and guarding the state against the erosion of territory, Ottomanism and then 
Pan-Islamism, had been unsuccessful.99 The loss of territory had become such a fear that 
it remained in the forefront of the Ottoman conscience into the twentieth century. 
Consider the frustrations of the Young Turks: “Within months of the 1908 revolution that 
had promised an end of territorial dissolution, lands nominally still Ottoman became 
formally separate or independent: Bulgaria, Crete, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”100 Ottoman 
reaction after this loss of territory was to protect what remained of the empire and to 
centralize the state while tightening its grip on those that remained.  
B. REFORM 
1. Early Attempts at Reform 
At the end of the eighteenth century, Sultan Selim III recognized the need for 
administrative reform within the empire. In order to address the changes required to 
fortify the Ottoman state, the sultan sought to reconsolidate his sovereignty into a more 
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centralized state with better control of its outlying territories. A provincial system 
emerged as the preferred instrument of administrative reform. 
New laws required the establishment of twenty eight provinces, each with its own 
provincial governor, or vizier.101 These governors would serve “at least three years and 
no more than five, in a given province under normal circumstances.”102 Despite a desire 
to centralize, however, the sultan did not have the army or funding to effectively control 
such a system: “Legislation represented only a neat paper solution to the enormous 
challenges posed by the fragmentation of the empire.”103 The glaring example was the 
appointment of Mehmed Ali as governor of Egypt who had garnered enough local 
support to gain the sultan’s approval, despite not conforming to the Ottoman 
gubernatorial ideal: “His boldness underscored the fecklessness of Ottoman 
administrative reform and demonstrated just how far a provincial governor could go in 
challenging the imperial center.”104 In attempting to bring the periphery under the central 
control of Istanbul, the sultan acquiesced to the whims of the very peoples and 
institutions he was trying to bring under tighter control. These concessions contributed to 
renewed efforts of implementing ineffective reform and did little to achieve their 
intended goals. 
Militarily, the Ottoman Empire had developed an undesirable record of defeats, 
most notably at the hands of the Russians with whom the Ottomans were at war 
frequently throughout the eighteenth century. A complete restructuring of the army was 
required but adamantly resisted by the Janissaries, as was any suggestion to base a new 
army on a European model.105 Selim III, therefore, was forced to continue a pattern of 
ineffective reformation begun by his predecessors that included the adoption of European  
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strategy, tactics, training, and equipment.106 Eventually, instead of an overhaul of the 
Janissary Corps, new troops were established, proven effective in battle, and stationed in 
Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces.107 
2. The Tanzimat  
The millet system had been in place for almost four hundred years when the the 
Hatt-i Sherif was issued in 1839 and, perhaps, the imperial administration had 
underestimated the enduring nature of the millets in light of their predecessors’ policies 
of religiously dividing and ruling their non-Muslim subjects. To expect such monumental 
social change in a relatively short period of time suggests that the Ottoman administrators 
had succumbed to significant internal and external influence that demanded the empire 
not be relegated to an anachronistic state in the international community. Such reform 
differed from previous Ottoman attempts at reform in that it embodied an entirely 
different character; rather than previous attempts that sought to preserve the ‘old’ ways 
and establishments of the empire, the Tanzimat reforms strived for modernization of the 
state and many were based on western ideals and models.108 Indeed, much of the 
language of the decree itself, ushering in as it did a new era, was heavily influenced by 
similar documents in the west: “Though presented in the context of the Ottoman 
experience and expressing particular goals rather than abstract principles, the decree of 
Gulhane thus encompassed many of the ideals contained in the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.”109  
Despite blaming the shortcomings of the empire on a failure to follow the Qur’an 
and shari’a, this decree set forth several important changes in areas such as tax collection, 
capital punishment, conscription, and property rights. The message, it was hoped, would 
reach its audience abroad, specifically in Europe, which would then be more receptive to 
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Ottoman inclusion among the European states: “In a sense, the document served as an 
assurance to the Great Powers that demanded domestic reforms in return for future 
recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the concert of Europe.”110 Indeed, the 
man behind the document, Mustafa Resid Pasha, was a leading advocate of joining the 
ranks of the Europeans.111 But what was most significant about the edict was the message 
to the subjects within the Ottoman Empire: it would apply to all subjects regardless of 
religion. In transcending the criteria by which it had previously considered its non-
Muslim subjects, a new ideology of Ottomanism was adopted which dictated that all 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire were now first and foremost Ottomans, and secondarily 
considered Greek, Jew, or Armenian.112 Response on behalf of the Ottoman subjects to 
the reforms of 1839 was, however, slow and because of this, an additional decree was 
issued. The Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 was decidedly less grounded in Islam and provided 
a more definitive basis for the secular Ottomanist ideology related in 1839 by announcing 
the equality of all subjects of the empire regardless of religious affiliation. This 
reinforcement of the idea that all subjects were equal was at once western in its character 
and radical in its attempt to undermine the basis of centuries of Ottoman rule. The 
Tanzimat, however, saw it as crucial in instituting the measures that would save the 
empire. The four officials instrumental in drafting and carrying out the reforms113 were 
themselves influenced by European political and cultural ideas and shared the same ideal 
of equality for all. 
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Western reaction to Ottoman reform in the nineteenth century was often 
suspicious.114 The timing of the issuance of mandates often followed a crisis115 and was 
suspected as being simply a means of appeasing European powers to join their ranks. The 
Hatt-i Sherif of 1839 was issued when a crisis in Egypt, led by Muhammad Ali, imperiled 
Ottoman borders and depended on Europe to back it up in order to resolve the crisis. The 
Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 was issued as a means of avoiding Great Power intervention in 
overseeing certain measures promised after the Crimean War. The constitution of 1876 
was instituted when ministers from European nations were meeting in the Ottoman 
capital to discuss reforms for the empire. But Davison is quick to point out that while the 
timing may have been such that the issuances of these documents followed certain crises, 
their content was not that of a hasty response to threatening events.116 In fact, it may have 
been the timing of their issuance that persuaded the sultan and the Ottoman 
administration to approve them at all.117 The reaction among Muslims and the leadership 
in the millets was one of hopelessness,118 as the former had technically been stripped of 
their status as privileged subjects and the latter had no legal grounds for their positions 
within their own millets.  
Tanzimat reform resulted in social and cultural consequences that were the 
opposite of what the Ottoman government had intended. In its emphasis on placing all of 
its subjects on an equal footing, the edicts issued in 1839 and 1856, rather than promote 
Ottomanism among the empire’s subjects, served instead to emphasize the nascent 
nationalism that had replaced religion as the primary criterion on which millet identity 
was based. But it was not only the attitudes of the empire’s minority populations that had 
changed; deep resentment among Ottoman Muslims toward Ottoman Christian, Jewish, 
and Armenian subjects was reinforced as those Ottoman Muslims who had previously 
been the dominant group within the empire saw their status as such in peril. Great Power 
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capitulations, cries of independence from minorities in the periphery, and the constant 
threat of the erosion of the empire to Russia and Europe all served to promote and 
emphasize a discrimination among Muslims toward non-Muslims. 
C. FAILURES OF REFORM 
1. Muslim Reaction to Reforms 
Since their conquest, Christians and Jews had been relegated to the role of 
dhimmi119 within the empire. As non-Muslims, they were automatically and should 
forever be considered inferior to Muslims. The basis for this projection of Muslim 
superiority is simply the tenet that Islam is the one true religion and others, while 
tolerated, could only be inferior. Coupled with Tanzimat advocacy of Ottomanism 
(Osmanlilik), this simply did not make sense to a majority of Ottoman Muslims: “And 
Osmanlilik, as a purely political concept of the allegiance of peoples of all creeds to a 
ruler who treated them equally, was unreal, because of the traditional concept of 
‘Osmanli’ had always carried strong implications of Muslim orthodoxy as well as of 
loyalty to the Ottoman state.”120 The subversion of the status of Muslims by non-Muslims 
as the latter gained greater protection from foreign powers and seemingly the Ottoman 
government, was realized by many of the empire’s Muslims as certain subjects among the 
Christian, Jewish and Armenian populations became wealthy, better educated and no 
longer inferior as a result of Great Power intrusive policies. Non-Muslims were enjoying 
the same or better privileges as “believers” and this did not sit well with many of the 
empire’s Muslims. Policies of discrimination toward non-Muslims would have drastic 
consequences for Armenians, particularly in those areas the Ottoman state was never able 
to adequately control: provinces on the periphery. 
Social and economic conditions worsened in areas the state could not effectively 
police and in which it relied on Muslim populations to regulate. Though it continued to 
petition the Porte to address social injustices, the Armenian provincial population 
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remained a victim of inaction from the center in what the capital considered local 
circumstances. Problems were to be handled at the local level: 
Beyond specific urban centres and regions, however, the Tanzimat did not 
bring the envisaged reforms in eastern Anatolia, bringing instead 
dislocation and no little chaos. This was due in large part to non-
implementation or obstruction of reforms by Ottoman provincial officials 
reliant on the support of, or even under the control of, local Muslim 
notables with an interest in the status quo. Local power bases were an 
obvious problem for the state’s wider reform agenda of centralization and 
control.121 
Such delegation of authority, combined with the attempted implementation and eventual 
failure of Tanzimat reform, inevitably led to deplorable conditions for Armenians outside 
the capital.    
Specific conditions deserve mention as, in the face of the failure of the Tanzimat, 
they were either a continuation of practices because Muslims in these areas chose to 
ignore the reform laws, or they were instituted in response to displeasure with such 
policies. Bloxham’s description of these practices summarizes the expansiveness and 
harshness of life for Armenians in the provinces and deserves inclusion here for its 
comprehensive nature: 
In the case of eastern Anatolia, the comparatively tolerant religious 
tradition of Bedr Khan was replaced by the rule of often militant sheikhs 
of sufi orders. Moreover, the imposition of centralized taxes and partial 
central control effectively meant that for many Armenians the pre-existing 
tax burden was doubled. Further, the practice of Kurdish ‘wintering’ in 
Armenian quarters persisted despite legislation to the contrary in 1842, for 
the nomads regarded it is a hereditary right, while the breakdown in the 
client-protector system meant that many Kurdish tribes simply began to 
pillage, kidnap and rape on a much greater scale than hitherto. From mid-
century, the Armenian population also suffered as its lands were 
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and also allocated to Muslim refugees fleeing Russian rule from the late 
1850s and from the new Balkan states thereafter. These muhacir brought 
into Anatolia both competition for resources and a considerable residue of 
bitterness regarding the treatment they had received at the hands of 
Christian regimes, bitterness that they often took out on indigenous 
Christians.122  
The conditions among the majority of Armenians in the provinces were deplorable. In the 
opinion of Armenians largely in the European and Russian diasporas, political petition 
through the Armenian elite in Istanbul yielded little results. Alternate, more effective 
forms of political representation were required to improve the standard of living among 
rural Ottoman Armenians. 
Another crucial aspect of the lives of the subjects of millets was the fact that 
military service was most often the exception rather than the rule. A tax was remitted that 
provided for a pardon from the obligation that remained the duty of Muslim subjects: 
army service. Further clarification is needed on this point, however, as this was not a fee 
to avoid military service, but rather a financial burden extracted from all non-Muslims as 
they, until the Tanzimat, had previously not been allowed to serve in the army. 
Christians, however, were content to continue paying the tax123 and avoiding service as 
they could benefit from the traditional military service of Muslims. Muslims, in turn, 
welcomed Christian army service, only in that they could supervise it; Christian officers 
would have been a difficult development in the army.124 Though an opportunity of 
equality as a result of the Tanzimat, this policy, like the other reforms of this era went 
largely ignored in practice: “In theory the equal right to serve in the armed forces 
remained, but in fact the whole matter was quietly buried, and the old exemption tax 
reappeared under a different name.”125 The lack of implementation of this policy of equal 
service and the observance of a tradition of Muslim service, however, would benefit 
those in the millets more than the empire’s Muslims: “This, together, with the removal of 
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restrictions on land purchase and other forms of discrimination and oppression which had 
impeded them, put rayas in a very advantageous position to compete with Muslims.”126 
But feelings among Muslims in both the center and the periphery of the empire were 
changing in response to what they saw as a minority threat to their power and prosperity.  
2. Continued Western Interference 
Led by European economic leverage, the West continued to meddle in the 
empire’s affairs and this interference would eventually result in western dominance of the 
Ottoman economy in a gradual whittling away of sovereignty. The Ottoman Empire, 
particularly on the periphery, was susceptible to western incursion. Napoleon’s invasion 
of Egypt in 1798 was simply one instance of many in what became in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries a pattern of continued European intrusiveness in the empire. Russia 
and Austria had absorbed lands in the east and west respectively, but these were lands in 
which Muslims constituted a minority.127 Much more telling were Napoleon’s invasion; 
the occupation of Perim by the French in 1738 and again by the British in 1799; and the 
French incursion into Algeria in 1830.128 The powerlessness of the Ottoman state to 
counter such imposition on its territory did not go unnoticed. Nor did the Greek revolt in 
the early nineteenth century. This is perhaps one of the most important developments of 
the period. It was only after Greek insurgents received backing from abroad that the 
revolt was successful and this served as an example for future European intervention in 
the empire on behalf of the empire’s minorities.129 
The continued interference of Britain and France in the empire resulted in several 
developments in the nineteenth century that saw the erosion of Ottoman sovereignty. 
Support for this claim is inherent in two important historical developments of this era: the 
allowance of British land ownership as a result of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 
Baltalimani (1838) and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration by France and Britain.  
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In 1838, the Ottoman Empire formalized a treaty that gave Great Britain a distinct 
trading advantage. Ease of export restrictions, competitive tariffs, and unrestricted 
purchases of Ottoman goods were outlined in the treaty.130 The Porte, since abolishing 
monopolies in several sectors, hoped this more open economic policy would recoup 
revenue foregone as a result of the elimination of the monopolies and the diminution of 
tariffs.131 Previously, the Ottoman state taxed products according to the country of origin 
of the buyer.132 The effect, however, was negative throughout the economy: British 
imports enjoyed a 3 percent tax while Ottoman exports were charged up to 60 percent.133 
These practices also prompted other countries with trading interests in the Ottoman 
Empire to petition for and receive similar policies. 
Having become more involved in the world economy, the Ottoman Empire 
advocated the elimination of the capitulations in an effort to be treated as equals in the 
international community.134 Due to the further advantages garnered to the Great Powers 
in the capitulations, they refused. In dire need of funds following the Crimean War, the 
Ottoman Empire had little choice but to turn to Europe for loans that would commence a 
trend of debt: the Ottomans borrowed from Britain and France at rather high rates and 
when there was no money in the treasury to pay their creditors, borrowed heavily again to 
meet the interest payments.135 European control of the Ottoman economy was an 
inevitable result. When the Ottoman Empire defaulted on its loans in 1876, the Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration was formed in 1881 that completed European domination of 
the Ottoman economy. As the European powers acted in their own interests, Ottoman 
economic development stagnated;136 Ottoman dominion over their own state was all but 
gone. 
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3. Continued Failure on the Battlefield 
A pattern of Ottoman military defeat separated the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries from previous centuries that were characterized by the empire’s military 
successes and expansion. Several factors contributed to military failure in the late empire. 
European states gained the advantage over Ottoman forces due to a combination of 
factors that included improved weapons technology, wealth from the New World, and 
improvements in defenses (where previously the Ottomans had an offensive advantage 
over weaker defenses).137  
In the eighteenth century, several conflicts deserve note. The Russians emerged in 
the late seventeenth century and would be a constant source of enmity and war in the 
centuries that followed. From 1677 to 1878, the Ottomans fought their Russian foes nine 
times, as well as opposing the Russians in the Crimean War and World War I.138 In Zenta 
in 1697, after conflict with the Hapsburgs, the empire suffered its first defeat that resulted 
in the forfeiture of Ottoman territory (Hungary, Transylvania, and Dalmatia), when 
previously simply removing Ottoman troops were an adequate concession in defeat.139 
This pattern of territorial loss in military defeat continued: the Treaty of Passarowitz in 
1718 (some Serbian lands and Wallachia); the Treaty of of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 (vast 
portions of the Black Sea shoreline); and the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 (Georgia).140 The 
Ottoman – Russo War of 1877-8 was perhaps the most critical for Armenians with its 
resultant Treaty of San Stefano and subsequent Treaty of Berlin, and will be discussed 
later in this study in an Armenian historical context.  
While there occurred some Ottoman victories in the early to mid-eighteenth 
century, the 1700s were most notable for the losses sustained by the Ottoman Empire that 
culminated in a serious threat to Ottoman sovereignty with the invasion of Egypt by 
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Napoleon in 1798. Territorial losses were also sustained on the periphery to state 
challengers from within. The losses sustained in the nineteenth century, however, belied 
internal dissention in the form of rebellion with the goal of secession, when previously 
such efforts were to simply change imperial policies.141 This change is illustrated by the 
Serbian rebellion in 1804142 and the Greek rebellion in 1821-30.143 But perhaps the 
greatest challenge to the Ottoman state was how those outside the state came to view this 
pattern of defeat: “With truly fateful consequences, some inhabitants of both western 
Europe and the partitioned lands falsely concluded that military strength/weakness 
implied cultural, moral, and religious strength/weakness.”144 Significant losses in 
territory, a record of military defeat, and perceptions of inferiority as a result, all 
contributed to the challenges the empire faced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In describing life within the Armenian millet under Ottoman rule and the 
associated social rifts among the Armenians themselves, one begins to see the conditions 
that led to the establishment of Armenian political parties as well as those among the 
population that would fill their ranks. Such parties were founded in response to the need 
to address deplorable conditions among the majority of Armenian living in the provinces 
under persecution at the hands of Muslims whose entrenched local authority undermined 
Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century. Making a bad situation even worse for the 
Armenians was the status those among them in Istanbul enjoyed as a result of a berat, 
favorable practices under the capitulations, or wealth and skill on which the Porte could 
rely. Under Great Power protection, one could become an Englishman or Austrian and 
enjoy the status of citizenship under the laws of those countries. Improvement in the lives 
of Armenians due to Great Power policies within the empire brought the ire of Ottoman 
Muslims.  
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Together with mandates that promulgated non-Muslims be treated equally, it may 
be said that the reforms attempted in the nineteenth century served to hurt those whom 
they were intended to help the most. The millet system eventually served the purposes of 
several religious minority communities within the Ottoman Empire by solidifying a sense 
of community along religious then ethnic divides providing a readily identifiable “nation” 
within the empire with whom the Great Powers could ally and use to their own end 
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
A. ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE FIFTEENTH 
CENTURY TO THE TANZIMAT 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the manner in which Armenian 
revolutionaries emerged in response to social conditions that were a result of Ottoman 
reforms. Before proceeding to a description of these groups, their ideologies, and 
programs, it is first necessary to review what life was like in the Armenian millet with 
special attention paid to the conditions as they continued to depreciate among Ottoman 
Armenians as a result of Hamidian reforms. As state and social forces intensified and 
varied the methods by which they persecuted Armenians, the development of the 
Armenian revolutionary movement can then be understood in the context of a population 
under siege in their fatherland. 
1. 1453 to 1839 
There is, perhaps, no better description of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth 
century than that of Karen Barkey: “The empire that was built after 1453 became a 
robust, flexible, and adaptive political entity where a patrimonial center, a strong army, 
and a dependent and assimilated state elite interconnected with many diverse and 
multilingual populations ensconced in their ecological and territorial niches.”145 Indeed, 
the challenge for the Ottoman Empire in acquiring new lands and peoples was that these 
new subjects had to be administered in a manner that asserted the authority of the central 
government, benefitted the empire in some way, and diminished the prospects of 
rebellion and secession. The Armenians were to be among these new and diverse 
conquered peoples that posed such challenges to the Ottoman government. 
The Turkomans, specifically the Ak-Koyunli and Kara-Koyunli tribes after 
Tamerlane died in 1405, ruled the Armenians until they were replaced in 1514 by 
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Ottoman Turks led by Sultan Selim I.146 It was then that Armenia was absorbed into the 
Ottoman Empire. This early period under Ottoman rule saw Armenians caught in the 
midst of land grabs among raiding tribes, especially Turkomans, as well as conflict 
between empires, the Ottomans and Safavids in particular.147 Transplantation also 
contributed to the dispersal of the Armenian population: Persians relocated significant 
numbers of Armenians from Ararat to Persia in the vicinity of Isfahan in 1605 during a 
period of Turkish-Persian fighting.148 Thus, when a truce was called and borders redrawn, 
there remained a portion of the Armenian population within the borders of the Persian 
Empire: 
The smaller area of Armenia, which included the Holy City of 
Etchmiadzin, went to the Shah and was known as Persian Armenia. Amid 
continuing invasions, large numbers of the population, especially among 
the aristocracy, left the country, and Armenian history flowed into two 
channels: the homeland and the Diaspora. The place of the original 
population was gradually filled by Turks, Kurds, and Turcoman tribesmen 
who abused and exploited the native Armenians.149 
Another portion of the Armenian population would later fall within Russian 
borders in the early nineteenth century with the Russian conquest of Transcaucasia. The 
treaty agreed upon by the two empires after the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828 
established that two Armenian provinces, Nakhichevan and Erivan, would be annexed by 
Russia.150 By the early nineteenth century, the Armenian population consisted of the 
majority in Ottoman Armenia as well as a significant diaspora divided amongst the 
Persian and Russian Empires. In the Ottoman Empire, which still contained the majority 
of the Armenian population and was affectionately referred to as the fatherland, most 
                                                 
146 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 17. 
147 Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, “Introduction,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes 
and Meier, 1982), 21.  
 148 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 17. 
149 Ibid., 18. 
150 Ibid., 24.  
 41
Armenians lived in one of six provinces that made up the region known as Ottoman 
Armenia: Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diarbekiar, Sivas and Kharput.151  
One of the most important developments in the history of the Armenian people 
was the Armenian reawakening that occurred from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
century. This renaissance was the result of the arrival of standardized printing in the 
1500s; missionary education in the 1600s; an Armenian literary revival in the 1700s; and 
the renovation of the Armenian language and evolution of an Armenian intelligentsia in 
the 1800s.152 Much of this renaissance originated beyond Ottoman borders and was 
spurred by the Mekhitarist Fathers, whose break with the Armenian church in favor of a 
more Catholic oriented order led to their exile.153 Nonetheless, their contribution was 
instrumental: “The Mekhitarist Fathers revived the Armenian language, cultivated 
Armenian literature, spread Western ideas through translations, established scholarly and 
popular journals, instituted a network of schools, and laid the foundation of modern 
Armenian historiography.”154 The influence of this movement on the development of 
revolutionaries among Armenians was instrumental. 
The average Armenian within the Ottoman Empire, however, was not aware of 
such developments and instead was struggling to simply survive amidst war and 
insecurity. While they became the objects of the independence and, later, nationalist 
movements of those in the Armenian diaspora, they remained socially and economically 
separate and poor: “…the bulk of the Armenian population remained as they had been for 
centuries, peasants in Anatolia.”155 And yet, the suffering of this people would continue. 
Indeed, it would intensify.  
Several important factors may be gleaned from the Armenian history of this 
period. Firstly, wars geographically divided the Armenian population between the 
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Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires. Secondly, this division created a homeland 
within the Ottoman empire and a diaspora without. Thirdly, the Armenian reawakening 
that started in the sixteenth century directly influenced the revolutionaries of the 
nineteenth century. Fourth, and most importantly, the Armenian peasants that remained in 
the Ottoman Empire were the most innocent yet suffered the most at the hands of others. 
Many times, they were casualties on the fringe, caught in the crossfire in wars among 
states and between ethnic groups within the empire. This, unfortunately, would be a 
pattern that would repeat in modern Armenian history, culminating in genocide in 1915. 
2. The End of the Millet System  
The social history of Ottoman Armenians largely centers on the millet system. It 
is important to first understand how this system worked with the empire’s religious 
minorities in general in order to grasp the meaning of its dissolution on the empire’s 
Armenian population in the greater context of nineteenth century Ottoman reform. As the 
empire moved from a religious based system of rule to administration based on more 
secular ideologies, perceptions of and amongst its minorities changed in drastic and often 
unforeseen ways.  
The Ottomans divided their non-Muslim subjects into millets according to 
religion. As the empire at the time of the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 may be considered 
a theocracy,156 the manner in which the rulers regarded non-Muslims allowed for the 
continued use of the system they found among the ‘flock’ in the capital in the mid-
fifteenth century.157 Indeed, though commonly regarded as such, Abu Jaber158 represents 
one side of a debate on early considerations of millets: the system was not in fact an 
Ottoman invention, but simply an effective system already established that the new rulers 
could continue to use as an efficient administrative structure.159 The other extreme in this 
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discussion is that presented by Benjamin Braude who insists on a more gradual 
introduction of such a system: “First, the Ottomans had no consistent policy toward non-
Muslims in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and perhaps later as well. Second, as 
administrative policy slowly began to emerge over the centuries it was accompanied by 
mythmaking which created justifications for new policies by attributing them to the 
past.”160 For the sake of this study, the term “millet system” will be used to describe the 
various policies and administrative practices the Ottoman Empire used to rule its non-
Muslim religious minorities; they were regarded, and thus ruled, quite differently than 
Muslims.  
Mehmet II and his Muslim warriors comprised the heart of the state and had little 
time to administer the periphery; religious leadership among each group was responsible 
for seeing to the religious and cultural needs of their people. Tolerance of its religious 
minorities was a policy that allowed their survival within the empire in their respective 
millets, and recognized unique skills and contacts on which the empire relied. It was 
realized by the Sultan that these minority peoples were necessary for the prosperity and 
growth of the empire despite being non-Muslim. While they conquered, they exploited 
“…the trading and other skills of the minority groups over which they ruled.”161 
Furthermore, they were able to both gain new territory and subjects, as well as take 
advantage of the revenue extraction methods already in place within each community.162 
Ottoman interests were in expansion and prosperity, not in the welfare of its non-Muslim 
subjects: “…the Ottomans in the early modern period were not engaged in any kind of 
nation-building project but in an imperial-state-building effort that sought at one and the 
same time to maintain the distinctions of hierarchy between rulers and ruled, Muslim and 
non-Muslim, without integrating a disparate society into a single, homogeneous 
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whole.”163 Thus, the non-Muslims of the empire were tolerated as “People of the Book,” 
but never considered equal and discrimination at the hands of Muslims was often the 
norm.164 Indeed, several examples provide a bleak picture of life as a non-Muslim under 
Ottoman imperial rule: owning weapons was outlawed; only jobs Muslims considered 
beneath them were available to non-Muslims; and public prostration in the presence of 
Muslims was expected of non-Muslims.165  
The typical leadership in a millet consisted of a religious patriarch as the 
figurehead of the community under whom a council carried out the daily affairs of the 
subjects.166 The leader of the millet was often an elected official and was the face of his 
community for the Sultan: “Throughout Ottoman history each millet organized itself 
separately and had to receive formal recognition from the Sublime Ports. The head of 
each millet was the representative of that millet at the Ottoman court as though 
representing a foreign power. The head of each separate millet administered to its affairs 
on behalf of the Sultan.”167 The duties of the millet leader were many. Sharia could only 
be administered on behalf of an Ottoman Muslim subject and so the millet established its 
own laws for its own religious.168 The collection of taxes and their remittance to the 
Sultan was another responsibility of the head of the millet, as was keeping his people in 
line and in order.169 For Armenians, leadership was embodied in the patriarch of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church.170  
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Though he enjoyed the favor of the Porte and auspicious status by the court, his 
influence among Ottoman state leadership eventually diminished to strictly religious 
affairs. Of particular concern for Armenians in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
was the deplorable economic conditions within the provinces. In a telling historical 
example of the restrictions of the office of the patriarch, Archbishop Khrimian, in 
attempting to work with the court to address such conditions, resigned in frustration after 
“the Porte made it clear that such concerns were not within the mandate of the 
patriarchate or the structures in its control.”171 Such frustration was consistent with the 
aims of the state, however, as the millet system had only ever been intended to provide 
for the religious and cultural needs of its people, and not a sponsorship for participation 
in Ottoman politics.172 Though largely excluded from the Ottoman political process, there 
remained in the center of the empire those whose skill and wealth seemingly transcended 
religious cleavages and garnered an urban elite from various religious minorities that 
enjoyed the favor and influence of the Porte. It was thus along class lines that the internal 
divides of the Armenian millet were observed. 
Armenians within the millet constituted two groups: an urban elite and a 
provincial peasantry. The amira were the affluent Armenians who enjoyed significant 
privilege with the Sultan and his court.173 Members of this wealthy class served the state 
in many ways. Many amira were sarrafs who guaranteed the payments of those bidding 
on the right to collect taxes within the iltizam and in turn received a commission for this 
role.174 Several positions within the imperial mint were held by amira, including the 
darphane,175 and prominent bankers added to the amira ranks. Other official positions 
were dynastic in nature, as was the case with the Dadians and imperial ordnance 
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manufacturing, as well as the Balians and the position of “chief architect”.176 Despite 
their favor with the sultan, the power this class had with the Porte was negligible.177 
Within their millet, however, they wielded immense power to include the real power 
behind the patriarchate.178 In certain instances, the amira would work against the other 
Armenians within their own millet, maintaining passivity in the face of exploitive 
Ottoman policy as it served their efforts at self-preservation.179 Active intervention with 
the Ottoman administrators often did not bode well for Armenians outside the amira 
class, “When social tensions between the rich and the not-so-rich tore at the fabric of the 
Armenian community and threatened the peace of the Ottoman capital, the sultan 
responded to the pleas of leading Armenians and reluctantly granted a ‘constitution’ to 
regulate the Armenian millet.”180 There is little doubt which class of Armenians the terms 
of the document favored. 
Differences within the Armenian millet were related to the manner in which the 
various groups responded to Ottoman policies. As described, the amira were considered 
by the Porte and many among the Ottoman elite in Istanbul to be the leaders of all 
Armenian Orthodox subjects. But, as they often acted on their own behalf with the near-
sightedness of an urban elite, they often overlooked or simply ignored those Armenians 
on the periphery. Libaridian distinguishes between the two groups of Armenians within 
the millet in considering the origins of Armenian revolutionary politics: azgasers, 
Armenian urban elites concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, and 
hayrenasers, those Armenians outside the center who were concerned with the negative 
effects of Ottoman policies:   
Until their [Armenian “revolutionary” parties] founding, the tensions 
within the Armenian millet of the Ottoman Empire had been articulated as 
a conflict between azgaser (nation or community lover) and hayrenaser 
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(fatherland lover or patriot), loosely corresponding to the Armenians of 
the urban centers who controlled the millet institutions and the poor  
Armenians in the provinces. Azgasers were content with the amenities 
provided by the millet system, and their identity was defined mainly by 
religion, on which the millet system itself was based…a hayrenaser’s 
main concern was the worsening situation of Armenians in the 
provinces.”181  
This political divide directly stems from the manner in which each group viewed 
the millet as a political vehicle. To put in terms of the modern political spectrum, the 
azgasers may be considered a conservative group and the hayrenasers subscribed to a 
more liberal political outlook.182 The former viewed any attempts by Armenians to 
petition the Porte as undermining not only their status but the millet system itself, while 
the latter group saw the same system as precisely the means by which to do this.183 In 
recognizing and emphasizing these social differences, the roots of an Armenian 
‘nationalist’ movement were born, and the shift from self-identification as a religious 
community was underway toward one of a more secular, nationalistic people.184 
As the millets became more secular in aspects of governance, the authority of the 
patriarch that was once unconditional was now shared among a body of democratically 
elected lay members.185 These representatives made public the manner in which they 
would govern and let the patriarch know they would resign from the sultan-mandated 
governing body.186 The days of absolute religious rule were over and a more democratic, 
secular means of governance was taking hold. The Armenian millet was able to 
implement its own constitution in 1863, “providing for lay control of an elected assembly 
as the keystone of its millet government.”187 The other millets would follow suit, though 
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their documents were not as comprehensive in their reform.188 Further influence is seen 
in Ottoman legislation: language such as that providing for the election of provincial 
representatives was similar to that in the 1864 Ottoman vilayet law, and even though it 
undoubtedly was influenced by other documents, the Ottoman constitution (1876) itself 
was influenced by that of the Armenian millet.189 It is not a stretch to say that the 
Armenian millet was a significant influence on the Ottoman Empire:  
When one considers the millet as a form of organization, a constitutional 
structure, one can find a continuous thread of influence in the nineteenth 
century from the Western example through millet organization to the 
Ottoman organization. The Western influences were Anglo-Saxon and 
French. The millet structure that best absorbed these was the Armenian.190 
It was the millet structure, particularly the Armenian millet, that brought much western 
influence to the Ottoman Empire and this influence can be seen as reaching into the 
highest levels of government.  
B. BIRTH OF A REVOLUTION 
The Armenian national movement sprung from revolutionary groups in Ottoman 
and Russian Armenia as a result of worsening conditions in the Ottoman Armenian 
provinces due to Hamidian policies and the hope that the Great Powers, especially in 
Europe, through the activities of these parties, would sympathize and intervene with the 
Ottoman government on the revolutionaries’ behalf. Hamidian policies that served to 
decimate the Ottoman Armenian population were: the establishment and subsequent 
employment of the Hamidiye; the implementation of a Pan-Islamist ideology; and the 
resettlement of Muslim populations that amounted to the redistribution of land from 
Armenians to these immigrants.  
The character of the parties themselves also reveals several challenges they faced 
in garnering support from within the Armenian diaspora. Geographic, social, and 
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ideological divides among the numerous Armenian revolutionary groups led to a 
movement whose inability to ultimately unite left them politically impotent both among 
themselves and with the European patrons whose assistance they so desperately sought. 
Of the three strongest Armenian political parties at the end of the nineteenth century, only 
the Armenakans were formed in Ottoman Armenia; the Hunchaks and Dashnaks were 
established in Russian Armenia from members of the Russian bourgeoisie whose 
sympathy with the Ottoman Armenian cause prompted their activism. Socially, they were 
members of a relatively wealthy, urban middle class attempting to help a disenfranchised 
peasantry in the rural provinces of Ottoman Armenia. There further existed ideological 
divides that could not be reconciled, specifically concerning the role of socialism within 
the movement. Lastly, besides the Armenakans, Hunchaks, and Dashnaks, there were 
myriad other groups, some existing as secret societies and some posing as legitimate 
organizations, whose interests lay in Armenian autonomy within the Ottoman, Russian, 
and Persian states, but whose cooperation as part of a larger movement was precarious at 
best. 
The majority of Armenian political activity was carried out by the Hunchaks and 
the Dashnaks and the groups employed different methods to achieve their goals that 
varied from public petition and peaceful demonstration to violence and terrorism. In 
relating the historical narrative of the origins and founding of these parties, the factors 
that led these groups to abandon nonviolent approaches and adopt those of seditious 
agitation against Ottoman authorities become clearer. As conditions became quite 
literally a question of life and death on a daily basis for many rural Armenians, some 
among the Armenian population became aware of the need for violence as a 
demonstrative tool that would bring attention to the cause; provide a means of enlisting 
support of stronger allies; and offer a means of countering policies instituted by the 
Hamidian administration under whose charge much Armenian suffering was occurring. 
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C. THE NEED FOR REVOLUTION 
Conditions within the provinces in Ottoman Armenia were dire when Abdulhamid 
II took the throne, and they continued to worsen under his reign. The promotion of Pan-
Islamism, the formation of the Hamidiye, eviction from an ancestral land, and the Russo–
Ottoman War of 1877 all contributed to a quality of life that was lacking in virtually 
every aspect of human dignity for Ottoman Armenians. The question of using arms 
among those in the provinces began as one of self-defense; among those in the Russian 
diaspora, it was an issue of revolution toward Ottoman Armenian autonomy.  
1. Hamidian Reform 
In an ideological shift from the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat to Pan-Islamism, 
Sultan Abdulhamid II succeeded in altering the secular nature of the failed reforms of his 
predecessors, in effect subjecting Armenian Christians to a persecution worse than any 
under the millet system. His establishment of the Hamidiye as a means of policing the 
Armenian provinces (an endeavor from which they profited immensely) sponsored the 
exploitation and wonton destruction of one of the empire’s oldest minority populations. 
Further contributing to the deterioration of conditions for Ottoman Armenians was the 
practice of resettling Muslims among Armenians, and on traditionally Armenian land. In 
describing these circumstances, one sees how very desperate the situation was for the 
Ottoman Armenians at the end of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. 
a. Hamidian Pan-Islamism 
Dashing the hopes of all Armenians for equality under an Ottoman 
constitution, Abdulhamid II abrogated the Ottoman constitution a few months after 
ascending to the Sultanate in 1876. His rule was absolute and he succeeded in effectively 
rendering the Sublime Porte to a mere administrative function while surrounding himself 
with devoted officials whose incompetence was often overlooked in favor of their 
loyalty. His intent with the implementation of Pan-Islamism was two-fold: he wanted to 
reimage the Muslim population as the core of the Ottoman Empire and “a polyethnic 
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brotherhood of Muslims,” while simultaneously fostering resentment among the 
European powers as “protector” of their Muslim populations.191 With the Ottoman 
Empire significantly militarily inferior to the Europeans, his proclamation as the head of 
a transnational Sunni Islamic movement was an attempt to prey on the Islamist 
apprehensions of Europeans and, it was hoped, to check the influence of the Great 
Powers.192  
In doing this, however, Abdulhamid II effectively re-instituted a system 
wherein non-Muslims became once again oppressed minorities. By politicizing his 
Muslim subjects under the banner of Islamism, equality was effectively abandoned and 
the formal notions of Muslim superiority over subordinate religious minorities was re-
established.193 The tides were changing in the predominantly Armenian Anatolian 
provinces. Due to the concession of vast swaths of land as a result of the Russo-Turkish 
wars of 1877-8, the ethnic composition of the region had shifted in favor of Muslims.194 
The efforts of the Ottoman government in implementing its new ideology were thusly 
centered on Anatolia.195 These efforts, however, were not without their own Muslim 
detractors, especially among non-Sunnis.  
The question of what to do with non-Sunni Muslims was dealt with rather 
bluntly; forced conversions were common, sometimes aimed at entire groups. The Alevis, 
for instance, were targeted in this manner: “Groups such as the heterodox Alevis, many 
of whom were ethnically Kurdish, were subject to an orchestrated attempt to subsume 
them within the Sunni community.”196 The new Pan-Islamism, it was hoped, would 
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placate differences among the Kurds197 and Abdulhamid II also provided opportunity for 
benefitting from the new ideology to Kurdish leaders. One such opportunity was 
inclusion in the Hamidiye. 
b. Russo – Ottoman War (1877–8) 
The Russo-Ottoman War that occurred in 1877–8 was the result of 
Ottoman conflict with Serbian and Montenegrin forces in Bulgaria in 1876 that resulted 
in Ottoman victory.198  Russia declared war in 1877 and invaded the Ottoman Empire 
reaching as far as Edirne in the west and up to Erzurum in the east with unremarkable 
Ottoman resistance except for a stand at Pleven.199 An agreement was reached in 1878 in 
the form of the Treaty of San Stefano which contained details that either granted Russia 
large swaths of Balkan lands or made them independent. The European Great Powers, 
however, saw this as an attempt by Russia to essentially control either directly or 
indirectly a large portion of the Ottoman Empire, which was precisely what it was.  
In order to stave off Russian dominance in the Balkans, the European 
Great Powers, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire met and reached a revised agreement, the 
Treaty of Berlin (1878). The treaty split Bulgaria with half under Ottoman rule and half 
becoming an independent state. Ottoman Bulgaria, however, along with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were Ottoman still but essentially autonomous. Russia gained important 
provinces from the Ottomans in the Caucasus. But of particular importance for 
Armenians was article 61 of the treaty which stated: 
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the 
improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the 
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the Circassians and Kurds. The Sublime Porte will, periodically, make 
known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend 
their application.200 
Armenians immediately celebrated its ratification. But such improvements in security 
were not forthcoming and Abdulhamid II used his clever diplomatic skills to appease 
Great Power oversight while doing nothing to enhance Armenian quality of life.  
c. Hamidiye 
The Hamidiye, officially the Hamidiye Light Cavalry (Hamidiye Hafif 
Suvari Alaylari) was a Kurdish paramilitary unit established by Abdulhamid II in 1890. It 
is important for its ethnicity, Kurdish; its religious affiliation, Muslim; and the land in 
which it operated, the Ottoman Russian front. As previously mentioned, settling 
differences among Kurds and uniting them under the banner of Islam was a priority for 
the sultan. Another important reason for forming this regiment was to ensure they 
remained an asset loyal to the Ottoman Empire: “These aims were to be accomplished 
through the arming and pampering of select Kurdish tribes, particularly their chiefs, who 
would now find it in their advantage to turn down any offers to work for ‘the other side,’ 
which the central Ottoman government saw as a distinct threat.”201 To control the 
population in these provinces, one had to control the local leaders whose authority 
mattered to the people living in the region.202 In forming this cavalry of some 30,000 
troops, the sultan would be able to exert Istanbul’s influence in an area that was “among 
the most difficult for the Ottomans to control.”203 Control was necessary due to the 
geostrategic implications of this land, then under the responsibility of the Ottoman 4th 
Army: “…this land was mostly important for strategic reasons as the buffer between its 
own dominions and the powerful empires to the east. It was the land that became the 
front line for many of the Ottomans’ wars with their eastern neighbors and the land over 
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which many of the battles were fought.”204 With its lands constantly coveted by enemies 
both within and outside its borders, the Ottoman government could ill afford to lose this 
territory. The Hamidiye, the Sultan hoped, would help provide security for the state in 
this land, or so its official mission related.205  
Other reasons for this cavalry included security from internal threats as 
well. The Kurds themselves, as previously mentioned, as well as the Armenians, were 
particular instigators of unrest in the eyes of the Ottoman government and this dissention 
could not be tolerated in a region of the empire considered crucial to its territorial 
integrity. The sultan was less concerned about the land itself, only that it remain in the 
hands of those loyal to the Ottoman state. As Kurdish tribal leaders began seizing land, 
especially Armenian land, for their own use the Ottoman government could serve its own 
purposes of keeping Armenians in check and garnering the favor of provincial Kurds by 
simply doing nothing:  
Although the central government did not initiate the process whereby 
powerful local notables began to appropriate peasant holdings for 
themselves, the state could certainly turn this development to its advantage 
by offering impunity of action to its supporters, here Hamidiye chiefs, to 
usurp the land of Armenian (and also Kurdish) peasants – land on which 
they could settle and become settled, and land from which the Armenian 
element, which was increasingly viewed with suspicion, would eventually 
be dispossessed.206  
The direct effect of this militia on an already oppressed Armenian population was 
devastating and forced many to migrate elsewhere or suffer the consequences of facing a 
better armed, better trained, and better supported enemy. 
d. Muhajir Settlement 
Land ownership and settlement was further complicated with the arrival in 
Anatolia of thousands of Caucasian muhajir, or migrants, of the 1877-8 Russo-Turkish 
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War.207 The concept of surgun, or exiling dissident populations, had not been uncommon 
and had been used by the Ottomans in the past as a means of altering demographics to 
better suit the empire’s needs.208 Such migration became an opportunity to strengthen its 
hold on this peripheral region: “In eastern Anatolia, though the land was actually already 
under the suzerainty of Istanbul, muhajir settlement and behavior served as a means of 
consolidating Ottoman control over lands whose future disposition had been threatened in 
1877-8. This was a process of internal colonization.”209 Such control, however, came at a 
price paid ultimately by the Armenians whose land was being, in essence, stolen from 
them. 
In time, such migratory practice became policy and the government was 
able to enhance the numbers of its loyal Muslim population in the region while tightening 
its grip on the Armenian population. It is important to consider the intent in the context of 
the numbers of people who were affected by this practice-cum-policy as well as the very 
negative effect it had on their daily well-being:  
The government offered incentives for many of these [muhajir] to settle 
along rail routes, and the policy of settling muhajirs in Armenian areas 
appears to have become systematic, putting more pressure on the land and 
increasing Armenian insecurity of life and property. Between 1870 and 
1910 some 100,000 Armenians emigrated and between 1890 and 1920 at 
least 741,000 hectares of Armenian property were illegally taken or 
confiscated by representatives of the state.210 
Such numbers affected the political agenda of both Armenians and the Ottoman 
government. 
Government sponsored muhajir settlement had a profound effect on 
demographic considerations within the empire. As the Muslim population grew in areas 
that had previously been inhabited by an Armenian majority, there now was the return of 
Armenians to a minority status. The argument that Armenian secession based on majority 
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population, for instance, was no longer relevant.211 As more migrants arrived in Anatolia, 
the Ottoman government was able to establish new boundaries for its provinces based on 
the changing demographics of the area “to further the goal of artificially reducing local 
Armenian majorities which the muhajir influx was achieving in reality, as well as 
reinforcing its central control.”212 Caught between an oppressive regime in the center 
whose support bolstered Muslim-led persecution locally, the Armenian population was 
forced to respond by fighting, moving, or dying. 
2. The Hope for Great Power Intervention 
Time and again Armenians attempted to gain the support of the Great Powers. 
The support Europe and Russia was willing to give, however, remained primarily of a 
moral nature; materiel and troops were not forthcoming, as the Armenian Question 
resulted in oral condemnation and diplomatic censure which the Great Powers could 
afford but not in concrete military assistance which their interests could not. 
a. Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers 
Abdulhamid II was a master at making promises to appease insistence by 
Europe and Russia that he institute reform for the welfare of his subjects while 
simultaneously breaking these pledges by doing nothing. In effect, he played the interests 
of one against the others:  
Ottoman leverage over the other Great Powers lay in exploiting their 
common fear of a disruption of the balance of power in Europe as a result 
of any one power gaining control or influence over the Ottoman territories. 
Accordingly, the sultan sought to stave off the threats toward Ottoman 
territorial integrity and pressures for administrative reforms in favor of 
particular ethno-religious groups by playing off one Great Power against 
the other-without, however, committing the empire to an alliance with any 
one power or alignment of powers.”213  
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His ability to manipulate the Great Powers and hold them at bay with what they wanted 
to hear, allowed Abdulhamid II to implement horrors among Armenians in the name of 
Pan-Islamism. 
b. Armenians and the Great Powers 
In stark contrast to Ottoman foreign policy, Armenians, particularly those 
in the nascent political parties, hoped above all else for Great Power intervention with the 
sultan on their behalf. Some Armenian political support came from Europe: the 
Hunchaks, for instance, maintained central headquarters in Geneva.214 In addition, both 
the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks received support from the Armenian diaspora and most 
of its leaders were Russian Armenians.215 It is no wonder then, that their activity, 
sometimes terrorism, was directed at a European and Russian (later, simply European) 
audience whom they hoped to influence with their plight in order to bring about effective 
intervention on their behalf. This remained a cornerstone in the agenda of Hunchaks and 
Dashnaks throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. Great Power 
support, however, never materialized. The role of Armenian revolutionaries in late 
Ottoman history still remains an important one and it is not insignificant that they were 
among the first revolutionaries in the Middle East to adopt terrorism as a tactic in 
attempting to create an autonomous Ottoman Armenia. In order to better understand the 
origins of the dynamics of political violence in this region, it is now appropriate to 
examine the origin and development of the Armenian Revolutionary Movement. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY 
MOVEMENT 
It had become clear to Armenians that the traditional leadership for Armenians in 
the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Apostolic clergy, was not effective in dealing on their 
behalf with the Porte or wealthy Armenians in Istanbul (the amira). Social and economic 
conditions for provincial Armenians had, after all, worsened under the guidance of the 
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church. Many Armenians, particularly those middle class and educated, living abroad in 
Russia and Europe, saw the need for something other than what stood for them in the 
capital and whose inability to effectively petition the Ottoman government on their behalf 
demanded a change in ideology, objectives, and tactics. More effective means of getting 
the attention not just of the Ottoman government, but of the Great Powers, was necessary 
and so their members believed secular revolutionary movements were required. The call 
to revolutionary methods was indicative of the political change of the day in Europe and 
Russia; secular ideologies were replacing religion in political expression and the impetus 
in thought behind the French Revolution, “liberte, egalite, fraternite,” had taken hold 
among populations within the Ottoman Empire. 
It is thus necessary to examine specifically why Armenian revolutionaries were 
established, what they hoped to accomplish and by what means they hoped to accomplish 
it, and who comprised these groups. What follows is a brief survey of the most important 
political groups of the Armenian revolutionary movement. Included are the 
circumstances surrounding their establishment, their goals and the means by which they 
hoped to achieve them, and a review of their activity. Of specific importance here is the 
manner in which the strategic objective shifted from one of self-protection of a local 
population which would probably entail violence, to a broader aim of Armenian 
independence, to advocacy in some instances of outright terrorism. Having discussed 
most of the social conditions that promoted the rise of revolutionaries, it is now necessary 
to proceed to the cultural and political circumstances surrounding their formation. 
1. Inspiration 
Until the Ottoman government began imposing secularist ideologies in the mid-
nineteenth century, the Armenian Apostolic Church, administered by the ordained and 
uninitiated alike, saw it as its responsibility to maintain the historical, cultural, and 
linguistic aspects of a long and rich Armenian legacy.216 The Armenian people were 
provided with a cultural well, so to speak, from which to draw motivation: “From the 
                                                 
216 Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 30–1. 
 59
church the people derived not only spiritual and moral strength but the inspiration for 
literary and artistic expression.”217 This made sense under the millet system where the 
church remained the bastion of authority on most aspects of life for the Armenians. 
It is important to note the different ways in which both the Armenian Apostolic 
Church and the Armenian Catholic Church influenced two groups: the Ottoman 
Armenian peasantry and the Armenian revolutionaries. Regarding the former, the 
Armenian Apostolic Church had historically incorporated lay and clergy alike in its 
direction.218 It also served a critical function as the primary Armenian political 
organization until the nineteenth century and served as a unifying entity among the 
Armenian diaspora.219 Finally, as evidenced by its central role in sparking an Armenian 
cultural “awakening” in the eighteenth century, the Armenian Catholic Church, 
specifically, its Mekhitharist offshoot, was largely responsible for shaping an early 
Armenian national conscience on which future revolutionaries would promote their 
goals.220 
The revolutionaries, however, maintained an icy relationship with religious 
organizations, the Armenian Apostolic Church in particular, into the twentieth century.221 
This hostility culminated in what Papazian calls the “Open, Close” dispute in which the 
Dashnaks attempted on several occasions to use churches to conduct political meetings 
which church leaders fervently opposed.222 Violence was not uncommon in these later 
(ca. 1906-1912) disputes until their resolution in 1912 with the Dashnaks ceding to the 
church’s wishes.223 But the revolutionaries derived inspiration, however indirectly, from 
those martyr-saints whose sacrifice was proliferated through church-sponsored education 
                                                 
217 Ibid., 31. 
218 Ibid., 31. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid., 32–3. 
221 Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, 32. 
222 Ibid., 34–5. 
223 Ibid, 36. 
 60
and served to inform the Armenian revolutionaries.224 The role of such sacrifice, argues 
Tololyan, “was not a minor aberration of political practice but rather part of a larger 
struggle for the right to lead the Armenian nation that developed in the nineteenth-
century and has continued unabated since.”225 The church, however much 
revolutionaries might have denied it, contributed to the early Armenian political struggle 
by glorifying the sacrifice of its martyrs and thus indirectly legitimizing the use of 
terrorism.  
When the church began to lose its authority during the Tanzimat, other sources of 
inspiration were sought. One area that provided such stimulus was the rapidly growing 
body of Armenian patriotic literature and its prolific authors. The earliest to write with 
revolutionary fervor was Khatchatur Abovian. Abovian drew his inspiration from his 
witness of war, his western education, and his political frustration. Having witnessed the 
decay of his Persian hometown as it was conquered by the Russians during the Russo-
Persian War of 1826-1828, Abovian wrote about tyrannical abuse suffered by Armenians 
in the Erivan region.226 Having spent a significant amount of time studying in Eastern 
Europe, he returned to Tiflis where he met stiff resistance to the western concepts he 
attempted to spread.227 Frustrated to the point of depression, he disappeared under 
mysterious conditions having left a legacy that would serve to inspire those to 
revolutionary ways in his wake:  
He inspired and influenced Russian Armenian writers, glorified the 
revolutionists, and tried to incite his downtrodden countrymen to act. His 
patriotic dedication set the groundwork and became the inspiration of the 
political parties of the nineteenth century. The new spirit of the age, as 
exemplified in Khatchatur Abovia in Russian Armenia, was to become 
evident in Turkish Armenia by the mid-century.228  
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The others that followed Abovian were Mikael Nalbandian, Rafael Patkanian 
(“Kamar Katiba”) and Raffi (Hakob Melik-Hakobian). Nalbandian was a poet born in 
Russian Armenia and educated in Russia, but was able to develop his socialist and liberal 
ideals on trips to Ottoman Armenia and Europe.229 He advocated political liberation for 
all peoples230 and wrote of the Armenian struggle extensively, emphasizing a more 
radical approach: “In order that the Armenians might obtain political independence, he 
advocated that they take up arms against their oppressors rather than rely on nonviolent 
methods and a waiting policy.”231 Patkanian was another poet educated in Russia, and 
who took to publishing extensively in various Armenian revolutionary journals, including 
Hiusiss which he founded in St. Petersburg.232 His fiery works inspired nationalism in 
many Armenians: “This famous poet aroused in his readers a love of country and a deep 
desire to redeem their enslaved homeland.”233 Probably the most famous Armenian writer 
to influence the revolutionary movement was Raffi, whose writing “served as a guide for 
organized revolutionary action.”234 Born in Persia, he lived mostly in Russia and had not 
received extensive university education. He relied more on his travels to Ottoman 
Armenia and Persian Armenia as an informal education.235 Raffi advocated liberation 
through education, but more influential for future developments in the Armenian 
revolutionary movement was his prescient (if unheeded) outlook on the larger, 
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Raffi … advocated unified, armed action against the regime in power. He 
also contended that the Armenians must rely on their own powers and that 
assistance from foreign countries could not be expected, since the latter 
had clearly proved that their actions were motivated solely by selfish 
interests.236  
There are two important aspects of these authors and their works that deserve attention. 
The first is the fact that not only did they advocate revolutionary activity among 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, but that they advocated armed dissention.237 The 
second is that they were popular among their intended audiences and their influence was 
spread widely.  
2. Self-Defense 
Besides the Armenian literary movement of the nineteenth century, a great source 
of inspiration for the various groups that would later promote the use of arms as a means 
of self-defense against Kurdish aggression, were the uprisings in 1862-3 in Zeitun, Van, 
and Erzerum.    
Within the Armenian provinces, the heart of the Ottoman Armenian resistance 
was Zeitun; Van and Erzerum were also places of substantial revolutionary activity.238 
Zeitun had remained a place of revolutionary prominence in the hearts and minds of both 
Ottoman and Russian Armenians: “Since Zeitun still remained semi-independent, it was 
probably considered a suitable center for political agitation by the Armenian intellectuals 
of Istanbul and Russian Transcaucasia.”239 It was in Zeitun, Van, and Erzerum that 
Armenians would clash in defense of their land and their lives. 
a. Zeitun Rebellion, 1862 
The Ottoman government realized the revolutionary potential of Zeitun 
and attempted to raise taxes and settle Muslim Tartars on Armenian lands in the 
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region.240 Ottoman fears, already heightened by years of Great Power intervention that 
chipped away at Ottoman sovereignty, boiled over into action against Zeitunlis because 
an attempt had been made by the Armenians to enlist Napoleon III and France to their 
cause against the Porte.241 This led to the Zeitun rebellion of 1862 in which a smaller 
Armenian force held off a much larger Ottoman force that had been brought in by the 
Ottoman government on behalf of Ottoman locals who had skirmished with a nearby 
Armenian village.242 The rebellion had been inspired by members of the Armenian 
middle class intelligentsia in Istanbul who belonged to the Benevolent Union, an 
organization dedicated to educational and agricultural improvements in the region of 
Cilicia and among the Armenian population.243 There is evidence in correspondence that 
the Benevolent Union had supplied Armenians in Zeitun with arms for the 
insurrection.244 The Zeitun rebellion of 1862 stands out as a significant development in 
the evolution of Armenian resistance at the time for two reasons. Firstly, it served to 
inspire other Armenians that challenging the Ottoman government under arms was a 
noble and necessary step toward autonomy. Secondly, it further demonstrated the 
effectiveness of cooperation among groups with similar, though not identical, 
revolutionary goals. 
b. Van Uprising, 1862 
The Van uprising of 1862 was significant, not only for its value in self- 
defense of the city’s Armenian population, but also because of the fact that Armenians 
and Kurds formed an alliance of sorts that allowed them to fight together against Ottoman 
troops. Cooperation with Kurds was rare: “…Armenians were virtually ‘the serfs of their 
ferocious neighbors.’”245 This rebellion actually occurred before the one at Zeitun, but “it 
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seems not to have had the same lasting impact on the discontented Armenian 
community.”246 Though it is significant for the fact that cooperation with Kurds was rare 
and that this cooperation existed at all meant that under certain conditions, exploitation at 
the hands of the Kurds was avoidable, especially in the context of a greater Ottoman evil. 
The deeper meaning to be gleaned from this brief review of this uprising is 
despite significant enmity among minority groups such as the Armenians and Kurds, their 
resentment of repressive Ottoman policies could be considered even more important and 
lead to compromises. As already discussed, however, and what a later rebellion in 
Erzerum in 1863247 reveals, is that such compromise and cooperation were indeed rare. 
The series of uprisings in 1862 and 1863 in Zeitun, Van, and Erzerum, as well as the 
groups behind such resistance served to inspire nationalism among Armenians in Turkey. 
These uprisings further provided the case for future revolutionaries that their cause may 
be effective and that resistance to the Ottoman government was a worthy cause. 
E. ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS 
1. Early Revolutionary Groups 
a. Union of Salvation 
Reform promised by the Ottoman government was never effectively 
observed in the provinces prompting the founding of the “first organized revolutionary 
society in Turkish Armenia”: the Union of Salvation founded in Van in 1872.248 In a 
significant contribution to the Armenian revolutionary movement and what was seen as 
subversion by the Ottoman government, this group later in 1872 contacted the Russian 
government in hopes of bringing a consul to Van.249 Such steps were deemed necessary, 
as repeated attempts after the uprisings in 1862 and 1863 to petition Ottoman officials 
were in vain. In Erzerum, for example, delegations had visited the Grand Vizier who told 
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them they were welcome to emigrate as that’s what they threatened if quality of life for 
Armenians in the province did not improve; in 1864, the Erzerum governor was 
petitioned for the same purpose with no success; in 1865, a delegation was sent to the 
Grand Vizier and was imprisoned before being told to return home; in 1867 complaints 
dismissed by the Grand Vizier who again suggested they leave the country if that was 
what they wanted.250 Such attempts at civilized petition of government officials was 
futile. The Union of Salvation was the precursor to what would be the first Armenian 
political party, the Armenakan party, founded in Van in 1885.251  
b. Secret Societies 
It seems rather simple, but after seemingly endless petitions of the Porte 
that were ignored or indeed used against them, and with Great Power promises fading 
due to a lack of effective pressure on the Porte, “No recourse remained but to depend on 
their own resources and to resort to revolutionary activity.”252 Given the very nature of 
revolutionary activity in an authoritarian state, Armenian revolutionary parties of the 
nineteenth century emerged as a result of secret societies whose purpose was largely to 
organize an Armenian self-defense posture. 
Clearly, conditions within Ottoman Armenia were deteriorating as a result 
of Hamidian policies if populations in the cities and villages of the Armenian provinces 
felt they had to arm themselves en masse. It is even surmised that the formation of the 
Hamidiye was a direct result of Armenian revolutionary activity: “European observers 
agreed that the Hamidiye had been established in response to the development over the 
previous years of Armenian revolutionary and self-defence groups, and combating the 
parties and their actions would certainly form one of the areas of Hamidiye activity.”253 
The skirmishes that occurred as a result of conflict between Armenians and government 
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sponsored forces (including Kurds), however, would provide a means of motivation for 
the organization of later revolutionary groups. 
Secret Armenian revolutionary societies, the Black Cross Society (Sev 
Khatch Kazmakerputhiun) for example, arose of a need to protect those Armenians who 
couldn’t protect themselves in the context of a deteriorating security situation in which 
unarmed Armenians experienced significant “looting, violence, and extortion of 
tribute”.254 Another secret revolutionary society, Protectors of the Fatherland (Pashtpan 
Haireniats), was formed in 1881 in Erzerum. “Its purpose was to arm the inhabitants for 
defense against any future attacks by Turks, Kurds, and Circassians.”255 The constitution 
and bylaws of these organizations were memorized for added secrecy. The organization 
of these societies suited their need to remain clandestine and they remained decentralized 
and organized into small groups with a leader who was inducted, and who then became 
responsible for finding ten members; initiation remained such that much of the 
membership was kept secret but it is estimated membership reached into the hundreds256 
and the Armenian Patriarch was eventually informed and approved of the Protectors.257 
The means by which societies such as the Black Cross and the Protectors were forced to 
function reveals much about the authoritarian state in which they lived and government 
fears of insurrection. 
Many in the Protectors were arrested following the discovery by Ottoman 
authorities of the revolutionary oath that had been printed with the intention of delivering 
it to potential donors in Russia.258 But the lingering effects of the group inspired pursuit 
of armed resistance: “It served to encourage the Armenians to an organized resistance 
against Ottoman oppression.”259  
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However, there remained very deep divides among those Armenians who 
would take to the revolutionary cause. Indicative of the severe ideological, tactical, and 
personal differences that were to come, “A general Congress of Armenian groups in the 
Diaspora took place in June, 1886, but instead of bringing about cooperation among 
them, the meeting caused much dissention and a disruption of untied efforts.”260 
Fragmentation would plague the Armenian revolutionary movement throughout the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century. 
2. The Armenakan Party 
a. Founding Members 
The Armenakan Party was founded by students of Mekertitch Portugalian 
and was greatly influenced by the revolutionary writings in his newspaper Armenia and 
his teachings at the Central Gymnasium in Van, which he had founded.261 It was in the 
province of Van that they decided they would focus their activities and it was also in the 
city that their concerns about raids and injustice at the hands of Kurds led them to adopt 
arms (mostly smuggled from other parts of Turkey and Persia) as an appropriate means of 
protection.262 Ter Minassian describes the group thusly: “The Armenakans were 
democratic and liberal patriots who had a clear perception of the economic and cultural 
underdevelopment of Asia Minor. But while they sought progress and ‘national freedom,’ 
they called for the use of violence and the arming of the Armenian peasantry for its own 
self-defense.”263  
The Armenakans, then, were the only revolutionary group founded by 
Ottoman Armenians within the Ottoman Empire; later parties such as the Hunchaks and 
Dashnaks were the result of a “Caucasian intelligentsia”: “Like its homologue, the 
Russian intelligentsia, this social group was numerically very weak and it was defined in 
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relation to culture (Armenian, Russian, or Western) and revolutionary ideology.”264 Their 
significance lies in the fact that they took steps to arm Armenians for self-protection and 
that they were the first to do so. 
b. Program 
The Program of the party listed its intentions as Armenian autonomy by 
revolutionary means through uniting, directing, organizing, spreading ideas and 
examples, instilling military training and a spirit of self-preservation through arms; 
mobilizing and striking when the time was right.265 But there was some ambiguity 
regarding specific points within the program that would later have to be clarified. The 
first was the vague location of where exactly the revolutionary activity would be focused. 
The second was whether it was restricted to Ottoman Armenians, or if it also included 
Russian and Persian Armenians.266 Another concern was exactly when the revolution 
would take place. As there was extensive military, political, and cultural training to be 
carried out among the Armenian populations by the Armenakan party, the revolution 
would occur “some time in the future.”267  
c. Revolutionary Activity 
The revolutionary activity of the Armenakan party was limited. 
Nalbandian relates one incident in which some members of the party were traveling from 
Persia to the Ottoman Empire and skirmished with Ottoman border guards after refusing 
to disarm.268 Two Armenians were killed and revolutionary material found on their 
bodies served to heighten the Ottoman government’s fears of rebellion within its 
borders.269 Little else is recorded regarding Armenakan revolutionary activity, but what 
has been chronicled accounts some of the earliest acts of the Armenian revolutionaries: 
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Three of these acts of agitation are documented: (1) Avetisian with three other 
men made a surprise attack on a Kurdish gathering with the intention of killing 
the chieftain. They were unsuccessful in their objective, but the raid resulted in 
the killing of two other Kurds; (2) aggressive action – including assassinations – 
was taken against Turks and Kurds by the two Kurdish –speaking Armenakans, 
Tchato and Shero; and (3) the murder of Nouri Effendi, a police agent of Van, on 
October 16, 1892, is attributed to four Armenian revolutionaries, among whom 
were Armenakans.270  
Though they did not have the clout or support to replace the church in 
speaking for Armenians,271 the Armenakan party was still an important organization 
within the greater Armenian revolutionary struggle, if only as the first group willing to 
organize as a political party that would represent Armenians in the provinces through 
armed resistance. 
3. Initial Ottoman Reaction to Armenian Revolutionaries 
The reaction to revolutionaries within the Ottoman Empire was severe and when 
instances such as those described in the paragraph above occurred, the Ottoman 
government was very outspoken, direct, and all-inclusive in its retribution. By publicizing 
and condemning such acts, the Porte became more and more concerned and willing to 
take action against revolutionaries that soon extended to the greater Armenian population 
whom the Porte associated with these revolutionaries: “It became apparent that the Porte, 
as part of its plan for Islamic revival, had intentions of placing all Armenians – men, 
women, and children, both guilty and innocent – into a single category marked for 
extinction.”272 It is estimated between 50,000 and 300,000 unarmed Armenians were the 
victims of state sponsored annihilation from 1894-1896.273  
Action was taken, at least in one Armenian city - Van, to defend against 
impending massacre in June 1896. Groups of Armenian revolutionaries had organized a 
defense of the city as Ottoman troops advanced and shortly after their arrival, they 
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clashed with the Armenians. The revolutionaries, while saving much of the population 
from slaughter,274 were either killed or routed. The defense of Van and ensuing battles 
left the region with no revolutionaries; Ottoman forces, by attacking Van, had not only 
forced them out of hiding, but were able to fight a united revolutionary front.275  
4. Hunchaks 
a. Who Were the Hunchaks? 
The Hunchaks were a socialist party founded by Marxists who were 
Russian Armenians and who never actually lived within the borders of the Ottoman 
Empire.276 Formed in Geneva Switzerland in 1887, “They were young persons, in their 
twenties, and were from well-to-do bourgeois families who were financially supporting 
them.”277  
They also had been influenced by Portugalian and his journal Armenia278 
as well as a European education, and their commitment to the grave situation in Ottoman 
Armenia and the need to do something about it was strong.279 When it became clear that 
Portugalian was not going to take immediate action, the students in Geneva saw the need 
to establish their own party separate from the Armenakans.280 They were thus 
instrumental in forming the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party. The organization of the 
party in Istanbul consisted of the Board of Directors which was responsible for the 
direction of all party activity in Ottoman territory.281 While they had bases in the 
Ottoman Empire, they took their direction from general headquarters in Geneva.282 The 
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Executive Committee carried out the direction of the Board but the two bodies never met; 
a Representative of the Two Committees acted as a conduit between them.283  
There was significant Hunchak opposition among the Armenian 
population, specifically the Armenian bourgeoisie in Russia who contested the Hunchak 
program on anti-socialist grounds, as well as the Ottoman Armenian elite whose self-
preservation was in opposition to the Hunchak program.284  
The Hunchaks did gain the support of educated Armenians in Istanbul, 
however: “they were mainly persons who held positions in foreign consulates and 
maritime companies.”285 Opposition to Hunchak efforts was based on suspicions that 
Armenian blood was being traded for “a dubious political goal.”286 The party listed its 
goals in its program, which had been tailored to be much more specific than that of the 
Armenakan party.  
b. The Hunchak Program 
The near term goal was independence via revolutionary methods of the 
Ottoman Armenians; the long term goal was the establishment of a socialist state in its 
place.287 Hunchaks also listed injustices in the provinces that, as mentioned in chapter I, 
included unfair taxes, inequitable and insecure land rights, and a lack of effective 
political representation. A legislative body was to be popularly elected and no one would 
be prohibited from contesting an office. Further, it called for several other ‘modern’ 
rights: “Complete freedom of press, speech, conscience, assembly, organizations, and 
electoral agitation” as well as “The person and home of every individual was to be 
inviolable.”288  
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The program was much more specific than that of the Armenakans. It 
specified the means by which the revolutions would be carried out: “Propaganda, 
Agitation, Terror, Organization, and Peasant and Worker Activities.”289 Propaganda 
would serve to educate revolutionaries; agitation and terror would instill confidence and 
fervor for the cause while eroding the Ottoman will; organization would be centralized; 
and the main revolutionary groups, the peasants and the workers, would not only provide 
most of the revolutionaries in the coming conflict, but also comprise the bulk of society 
and thus a responsible electorate.290 It further specified the time of the revolution stating 
it would occur “when Turkey was engaged in a war”.291 It also advocated allying with 
Turks and Assyrians in a more effective anti-Ottoman campaign.292 Lastly, it specified 
where their efforts were to be directed, Ottoman Armenia, due to the immediate concerns 
over conditions in the region.293  
It was heavily, and understandably, influenced by recent Russian 
revolutionary efforts to include the means by which revolution would be carried out as 
well as the centralized character of the party.294 These aspects could probably have been 
expected as the founders were themselves of Russian origin.  
The end state of the revolutionary movement, however, would be the 
source of great contention in the near future and would cause trouble for cooperation with 
other Armenian revolutionary groups as well as within the Hunchak party itself. Theirs 
was a nationalist movement aimed at the construction of a socialist state: “For the 
Hunchaks, nationalism and socialism were mutually compatible and could be 
harmoniously developed together.”295 But such a distinction was not as clear to others 
outside the party, specifically in the Ottoman government. 
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It is important to clarify what exactly the revolutionary parties adopted as 
their ideology. Though their origins were in the ideological leakage from Russia 
concerning populism and Marxism, both the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks related a 
socialist ideological basis in their programs. But as they further developed politically, 
nationalism became the dominant foundation for their activity.296 Bloxham points out that 
nationalism was not unique to the Armenians but that other ethnicities had similar 
aspirations and that nationalism, while addressing the injustices of a people, was not the 
only means available to address them.297 What basing revolutionary activity on 
nationalism did accomplish, as opposed to Russian revolutionaries who had based their 
movements on populism and Marxism, was to further heighten Ottoman fears that more 
of the state would be lost: “From the view of the palace, the significant characteristic of 
the parties was the agenda they shared with the previously successful Bulgarian 
revolutionaries, and the geographical location of the community it sought to 
‘liberate’.”298 As distress of further territorial loss stiffened the resolve of the state, so too 
did the smaller revolutionary movement gain strength among Armenians. 
c. The Demonstration of Kum Kapu 
A demonstration was held in Istanbul in 1890 wherein the Hunchakian 
Revolutionary Party organized Armenians to raise the Porte’s awareness of Armenian 
mistreatment in the provinces.299 Ottoman forces, however, intercepted them and the 
result was a riot in which many of the protesters were killed, jailed or wounded.300 The 
Hunchaks thought their effort in this demonstration was garnering Great Power 
interest.301 Great Power interest, it would be discovered, was one thing; effective 
intervention with the Ottomans, an entire other. This demonstration was significant in 
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two ways: it demonstrated a willingness on behalf of the Hunchak party to engage in 
peaceful protest and it revealed a willingness to sacrifice blood for Great Power 
intervention. The former would not last long due to growing frustration among Hunchak 
members and the latter was simply not forthcoming. 
d. The Sassun Rebellion 
Hunchaks were a major proponent in antagonizing the Kurds in and 
around Sassun in response to the practice among Armenians of paying hafir, a rent for 
Kurdish protection.302 Kurdish attacks against the Armenian population when they 
eventually refused to pay and the corresponding Armenian armed response led to the 
decision by the Porte to send in Ottoman troops. The ensuing rebellion saw the 
Armenians hold Ottoman forces at bay for several weeks before finally succumbing to 
defeat and extensive Ottoman retaliation for Armenian insubordination. A Commission 
of Inquiry sponsored by Great Britain, France and Russia found that “the misery to which 
the Armenians were reduced could not be justified.”303 This resulted in the Great Powers 
urging Abdulhamid II to implement dire changes in the social conditions in the provinces. 
The Hunchaks considered the rebellion a blow to the legitimacy of an irresponsible 
Ottoman government.304 The Hamidian government, however, saw it as an opportunity to 
do nothing about the conditions of Armenians in the provinces.  
e. The Demonstration of Bab Ali 
In 1895, the Hunchaks informed the government and the foreign 
embassies in their capital of their intention to conduct a peaceful demonstration aimed at 
bringing attention to reform in the provinces.305 A petition was carried and was to be 
presented to the Sultan which  
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Complained against (1) the systematic massacre of the Armenians by the 
Turkish government, (2) the unjust arrest and the cruel punishments of the 
prisoners, (3) the Kurdish injustices, (4) the corruption of tax collectors, 
and (5) the massacre at Sassun. It demanded: (1) equality before the law; 
freedom of the press; freedom of speech; and freedom of assembly; (2) 
that all persons under arrest be given the right of habeus corpus, and that 
the Armenians be granted permission to bear arms if the Kurds could not 
be disarmed; (3) a new political delineation of the six Armenian 
provinces; (4) a European governor for the six Armenian provinces; and 
(5) financial and land reforms.306  
Immediately after arriving at the Gates of Bab Ali, violence erupted, again 
with many protesters killed and injured; many more were imprisoned. This brought about 
European pressure on the Porte to introduce reforms and shortly after the incident 
(October 17, 1895), Abdulhamid II signed the Armenian Reform Program.307 Though 
welcomed as a positive development by the Hunchaks, this too was doomed as soon as 
the Sultan’s ink had dried.308 Instead, what occurred was the systematic killing of 
thousands of Armenians in retribution for agitation against the state in the name of 
Armenian nationalism.  
f. Zeitun Rebellion (1895) 
The Hunchaks staged another rebellion in Zeitun intending to put action to 
the rebellious sentiment in the town, that remained bitter since the events of 1862.309 As 
the promoters of this rebellion, the Hunchaks believed they could spread this rebellion 
throughout the greater region and incite other Armenians in Cilicia to a greater 
insurrection against the government.310 These greater plans would never materialize as 
the Turks instigated the fighting before the revolt could spread.311  
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In the interim, the European powers would again have to intervene on 
behalf of the Armenians, again because of an incident sponsored by the Hunchaks. Four 
months of violence in Zeitun between Armenians in and around the city and Ottoman 
forces ended only with European insistence on improved conditions for Armenians. 
Again, however, the promises made by the Porte to curb conditions under which 
Armenians in the area suffered were empty and were only made to temporarily appease 
the Great Powers. This was typical of Hunchak efforts throughout their revolutionary 
period. They attempted on several occasions to bring the support of Europe and Russia to 
bear on the Sultan, but as the Great Powers were not willing to provide troops to bear on 
the Armenian Question, their efforts were largely unsuccessful and angered Abdulhamid 
II to further persecute and murder Armenians in a series of massacres from 1894-6.312 
With such slaughter came the end of the liveliest era in the history of the Hunchak party. 
The Hunchak party soon split in 1896 over the question of socialism and the role it had 
played in hindering European support.313  
5. The Dashnaktsuthuin 
a. The Members of the Dashnaktsuthuin 
Several Russian Armenian revolutionary groups were founded with the 
goals of assisting Ottoman Armenians in their plight for freedom from Ottoman rule. The 
principal areas for these revolutionaries were in Transcaucasia: Tiflis, Erivan, Karabagh, 
St. Petersburg and Moscow.314 Student movements in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 
particular were dedicated to promoting recent Balkan independence as inspiration and an 
example of independence among Ottoman Armenians.315 Armed revolution was the 
instrument to accomplish this goal: “They considered it necessary to use illegal means in 
reaching their objective since no legal processes were available to them: revolution, after 
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the Balkan example, seemed to them to be the most expedient road to freedom.”316 Such 
groups, however, were not united in their efforts and this was the principal characteristic 
that hampered efforts at helping Armenians in the fatherland.317  
The most important organization to come out of the Transcaucus was the 
Young Armenia Society founded in 1889. This group sent armed troops into the Ottoman 
Empire to attack Kurds in hopes such action would enlist Europe into effective 
intervention concerning the Armenian Question.318 The Young Armenia Society went 
further than the rest of the Russian Armenian groups in smuggling arms to Ottoman 
Armenians and providing military training for Russian Transcaucasians for anticipated 
conflict in Ottoman territory.319 The core of this group, known as the Droshak, would 
extend geographically to found divisions in Russia, Turkey, and Persia and would help 
form the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.320 The events of Kum Kapu in 1890 had 
energized Russian support for revolution in the Ottoman Empire for Armenian 
independence.321 There was therefore the need to organize the various Russian 
revolutionary factions under a single organization. When the various groups, mostly in 
Russia, were consolidated into a single organization, they formed the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation, commonly referred to as the Dashnaktsuthiun (or more 
informally, the Dashnaks). This occurred in 1890.322  
Their membership was ideologically diverse, but can be categorized into 
three groups. Firstly, there were those who did not prescribe to socialism and whose 
interest lay in the development of a crusade that would lead to an autonomous Ottoman 
Armenia, similar to the Armenakan Party.323 The socialists were divided among 
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themselves into those whose revolutionary goal was the toppling of the Russian 
government and those revolutionaries who were interested in a liberated Ottoman 
Armenia, among whom were the Hunchaks.324  
The new party, however, faced many challenges not the least of which was 
basing the organization on a socialist ideology. This was strongly insisted upon by the 
Hunchaks.325 The various factions met in Tiflis in summer 1890 to address their 
fundamental and administrative differences. The federation of revolutionaries settled on a 
name, “Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries” (or simply “Federation”) and claimed 
Trebizond as their center.326 They also agreed to have two organs: The Hunchak (Bell) 
and the Droshak (Flag or Banner), with the former located in Geneva and the latter in 
Tiflis.327 
b. The Dashnak Program 
The new party’s manifesto advocated nothing less than the “political and 
economic freedom of Ottoman Armenia.”328 In doing so, however, many important 
details were left out or shrouded in ambiguity. For instance, how exactly Ottoman 
Armenians were to defend against other ethnic groups and Ottoman forces was unclear, 
as was whether the petition of Great Power support would be abandoned.329 
c. The Googoonian Expedition 
The first incident that affected this new federation was the Googoonian 
expedition. Sarkis Googoonian had long been preparing for an incursion into Ottoman 
Armenia with the objective to “cross into Turkish territory, divide into guerrilla units, and 
produce a state of chaos. He [Googoonian] believed that such agitation would forcibly 
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remind the European Powers of the promised reforms for Armenia.”330 He had overseen 
the training and arming of the men he would lead across the border and finally attempted 
this on September 23, 1890.331 The mission, however, was a disaster. The group quickly 
became lost, encountered resistance from Russians and Kurds and was finally caught and 
imprisoned by Russian Cossacks.332 Despite its failure, the Googoonian Expedition had 
three important effects: Europe was not persuaded to assist in any meaningful way; 
Kurdish tribes had been agitated; but Googoonian’s mission had also enhanced Armenian 
patriotism and “create[d] a stronger spirit of national unity among the Armenians in 
Turkey, Russia, and Persia.”333 Nalbandian equates the effect of the Googoonian 
Expedition on Armenians in the three countries, a “display of the romantic spirit of the 
age,” to that of the Armenian literary revival.334 But such soaring spirits on which the 
federation was founded were brought down to earth in the aftermath of this expedition 
and what followed was a period of inactivity in which hoped for European intervention 
never arrived to rectify Armenian misery.335 In fact, things got worse. 
As the Hamidiye had begun operating under the auspices of the Ottoman 
government, they wreaked havoc among an Armenian population exhausted from 
oppression and attack:  
The Sultan’s newly formed regiments were allowed to act without restraint 
in the provinces, where they deliberately raided Armenian villages, ruined 
crops, and massacred the inhabitants…These regiments were a formidable 
force in counteracting Armenian revolutionary activities, and of course 
these were regular soldiers operating in the provinces against mere 
partisan bands.336  
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The situation further served to isolate the Armenians in the provinces: Hamidian Pan-
Islamism was part of the mission of the Hamidiye.337 Forced conversions became 
rampant, and the divide between Armenians and Kurdish Muslims was widened and 
Armenians could not rely on Kurdish support as was the case in Van in 1862. More 
importantly, the Hamidiye became the sultan’s anti-revolutionary arm and retribution 
against suspected Armenian revolutionaries was most severe. 
Lesser known but still important Dashnak revolutionary activities included 
the establishment of an arms plant in Tabriz by Tigran Stepanian.338 It was staffed by 
men who had experience in and were adept at the manufacture and assembly of arms and 
munitions in Russia and such material could be assembled and stored at the plant for 
future use by revolutionaries.339 The recruitment of other minorities also became an 
important pursuit of the Dashnaks. Alliances with the Kurds, especially, continued to be 
pursued by the Dashnaks340 despite recent clashes between the two groups.  
d. The Ottoman Bank Incident (August 1896) 
In an attempt to garner European intervention on behalf of the Armenian 
cause, members of the Dashnaks in August 1896 attacked a financial institution in which 
the European powers had a stake. Twenty six Dashnak members took control of the bank, 
blocking the exits and entrances and threatened to blow up the bank within two days if 
their demands were not met. Their demands were related to foreign dignitaries and 
ranged from the return of land seized by the Kurds to Armenians to direct involvement of 
European powers in administering the Armenian population within the provinces.341 
After several hours, the Russian dragoman told the Dashnaks their demands would be 
met and the surviving revolutionaries (four had been killed and five wounded in 
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explosions aimed at keeping people from entering the bank) were escorted through an 
enraged horde and given passage from the capital to Marseilles.342  
The effect of this act of terrorism by a small group of Armenians on the 
Armenian population in Istanbul was incredible. Retaliation was immediate and 
disturbing:  
Government soldiers, softas (theological students), and police officers led 
Turkish mobs in the slaughter of the Armenians. Christians, regardless of 
guilt, were singled out and bludgeoned to death; women and children were 
ruthlessly cut down in the streets; and this reign of terror persisted in the 
capital for many days, resulting in terrible carnage and destruction. More 
than 6,000 persons perished in the massacre.343  
It is clear by this description that the retaliation was aimed at an ethnic population rather 
than those specifically responsible. It does not seem proportionate or justifiable by any 
measure. In fact, Nalbandian argues that the Ottoman government knew of Dashnak plans 
before the attack and had prepared for the slaughter of Armenians beforehand, while 
allowing the attack to proceed.344 The lasting effects of this incident are inherent in a 
cycle of violence in which the terrorist inclination of the Dashnaks and their role as a 
political group in the now withering Ottoman Empire prompted state authorities to 
retaliate against innocent Armenians.  
6. Irreconcilable Differences 
In 1891, rifts within the party between socialists and non-socialists widened over 
ideology and party leadership until Geneva decided to divorce the Hunchaks from the 
Dashnaks and become an independent party once again.345 This disunity certainly 
contributed to the revolutionaries’ lack of success: “The secession of the Hunchaks from 
 
 
                                                 
342 Ibid.  
343 Ibid., 178.  
344 Ibid., 177–8.  
345 Ibid., 164.  
 82
the Dashnaktsuthiun weakened the ranks of the latter and in the long run precipitated 
conflicts between the two parties which were extremely damaging to the success of the 
Armenian Revolutionary Movement.”346 
A second general meeting of the Federation was called in 1892 and this First 
General Congress of Armenian Revolutionaries resulted in the change in the name of the 
organization (from the Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries to the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation) to reflect the secession of the Hunchaks. It also resulted in a 
new program for the party which called for: free elections; “security of life and labor”; 
equality of all peoples; “Freedom of speech, press, and assembly”; land redistribution 
among poor; tax reform; an end to government-sponsored slavery; conscription; 
obligatory education; industrial development; and instilling traditional, rural “communal 
principles” in every Armenian.347 The new Dashnak program was, in essence, a critique 
of the Hunchak one.348 The methods by which this would be accomplished were also 
included and ranged from the proliferation of propaganda to outright terrorism.349 The 
organization of the party was also to be decentralized350 and this is only one, but a very 
important, manner in which the Dashnaks differed from the other parties.  
The Armenakans, Hunchaks and Dashnaks all agreed on a revolutionary path to 
ameliorate Armenian provincial conditions.351 The Dashnaks and Armenakans, however, 
advocated an autonomous Armenian land, whereas the Hunchak party sought a united, 
independent Armenia comprised of all Armenians in Turkey, Russia, and Persia.352 The 
lack of an independent state as a Dashnak objective would endure into the nineteen 
twenties; the Dashnaks wanted reform and autonomy, not independence from Ottoman 
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rule.353 Other differences between the three parties was the fact that, unlike the two larger 
parties, the Armenakans never incorporated a socialist ideology into the party, either in 
rhetoric or practice.354 
Dashnaks and, to a lesser degree, Hunchaks relied on terrorism to further their 
cause, while the Armenakans, as stated in their program, did not,355 at least not 
indiscriminately. Organizationally, the Hunchaks insisted on a centralized structure, 
while the Dashnaks after briefly adhering to the opposite, established a decentralized 
system.356 The Dashnaks and the Hunchaks both advocated allying with Ottoman 
Muslims they considered peaceful but the Armenakans stipulated no outside, extra-
Armenian groups.357 But the cleavages in the movement were largely attributed to 
stubborn, human behavior: “The underlying cause of disagreement between them can be 
attributed more to petty jealousies and personal feuds than to differences of socialist 
ideology, administrative organization, or geographical boundaries for revolutionary 
activity.”358 This explanation seems too general, however. It is more likely that these 
personality differences were fostered by deeper ideological differences. Specific 
differences that involved the evolution of nationalism as the foundation of Armenian 
revolution, and the role of socialism both undermined a united Armenian revolutionary 
movement.359  
F. CONCLUSION 
Several events triggered the organization of Armenian revolutionary groups. 
Internal to the empire, the ascension of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the implementation of 
policies such as control through forces such as the Hamidiye and mass migrations within 
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the empire (part of the sultan’s demographic restructuring plans) contributed to the 
deterioration of social conditions among Armenian peasants in the provinces of Ottoman 
Armenia. External politics also played a role in the destitution of the Ottoman Armenian 
population. War, of course, contributed to the transmigration of peoples into Ottoman 
lands and promoted the struggle over land possession. Most significant, however, was the 
role of the Armenian diaspora as it contributed significantly to the organization, arming, 
and funding of activities within the empire.  
The Dashnaks, the premier Armenian political party at the end of the nineteenth 
century, would continue their pursuit of agitating the Ottoman government, stressing that 
this was the only way: “Reforms, it still argued, and as it would again during the First 
World War, were only ‘granted a people up in arms, in protest.’”360 The importance of 
Great Power intervention on their behalf was also emphasized at its 1898 congress.361 
This was, above all, the immediate goal of the party and it was believed that the Ottoman 
capital, as an international metropolis, would remain the target of its activity for the 
exposure and attention dissention within the city limits would bring.362  
Revolutionary activity is most closely associated with the use of force by a faction 
within a population to address grievances they would otherwise be unable to address. 
Indeed, the Armenian revolutionary movement grew of a need to defend their people, 
their homes, and their land in predominantly Armenian (but less so as the 1890s 
progressed) provinces. The decision to use terror, however, is an important development 
not only in the evolution of Armenian revolutionaries, but also has implications for 
modern terrorism. The following pages will review Dashnak activity amidst the rise of 
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), as well as attempt to identify the reasons 
not just for the adoption of revolutionary methods by parties such as the Armenakans, 
Hunchaks, and Dashnaks, as covered in this chapter, but specifically those conditions 
under which some justified the use of terrorism specifically. 
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IV. 1896 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
A. ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARIES AT THE TURN OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Having reviewed the desperate social conditions among Ottoman Armenians as a 
result of attempts by the Ottoman government to stave off its destruction by 
implementing reform and the emergence of Armenian revolutionaries as a result, it is 
now appropriate to examine what exactly became of their efforts and what effect their 
efforts at attracting Great Power intervention had on the population they were trying to 
save. The intent of this chapter is to answer the question, “What was the impact of a 
change in government on Armenian revolutionaries, particularly the Dashnaks?” In 
answering this question, it is necessary to review the activities of these groups within the 
historical context of the close of the nineteenth century and the rise of the Committee of 
Union and Progress.  
1. Legacy of the 1894-1896 Massacres 
An important development that emerged as a result of the 1894-1896 massacres 
was that muhajirs and common Kurds became the instrument of death rather than 
Ottoman forces or the Hamidiye.363 This is important because it means anti-Armenian 
sentiment had grown deeper roots in the provinces; the revolutionaries were now fighting 
for survival rather than freedom. Also, Hamidian policies had the momentum to carry 
over to action of ordinary Muslim subjects; even when his orders were not formally 
directed at them, Muslims on the periphery were carrying them out.364 Furthermore, 
under his ideology of Ottomanism and its implied intention of unifying provincial 
Muslims, he was powerless to stop such action against Armenians, but it is improbable he 
would have wanted to.365  
                                                 




Killing Armenians was also a means of strengthening the broader sense of 
Muslim community in the region.366 This could be seen, then, as loyal subjects rising to 
the state’s defense of their own volition, against those who had “rejected Ottoman rule 
and therefore broken their contract with the state.”367 Local government officials were of 
a general mindset that the Armenians had done something provocative to incite such 
violence and the Muslim response was appropriate and justified.368  
The massacres occurred against the backdrop of the emergence of new Armenian 
political parties that provided convenient justification for the Hamidian regime: dubious 
confessions of atrocities by suspected Armenian revolutionaries and Armenian 
revolutionary propaganda provided an opportunity to publicize the Armenian threat.369 
More important, however, was the insistence by the sultan on projecting the actions of a 
few armed revolutionaries onto the greater, unarmed Armenian population.370 After the 
massacres, the ARF returned to its primary goal of organizing and leading the defense of 
the Armenian people within Ottoman Armenia.  
2. Seizure of Church Estates (1903)  
Amidst political conditions in the Caucasus that saw an intensified Russification 
directed at the smaller ethnic populations, Armenians were again the subject of 
persecution this time at the hands of Tsarist authorities.371 Specific policies aimed at 
making Armenians more “Russian” included disestablishing Armenian educational 
centers and forcing Armenians from government positions.372 Armenians, of course, did 
not take kindly to this approach and, when hints of rebellions made their way to Russian 
authorities, Tsarist adherents “suspected the Armenians of the Caucasus to be ‘rebels’ 
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who ‘aspired’ to independence.”373 At the forefront of such oppression was the Tsar’s 
representative in the Caucasus, Grigorii Golitsyn, who held the Armenian Church as the 
principal culprit in provoking unrest. Sporadic violence soon broke out in the region 
between Dashnak-backed Armenian revolutionaries and Russian officials and troops. 
Golitsyn held the church responsible and successfully petitioned the Tsar to take action 
which resulted in state control in 1903 of all Armenian Church properties in the region.374 
The situation quickly escalated. Armenian revolutionaries organized 
demonstrations involving Church officials as well as working class Armenians and the 
state responded with “police and Cossack terror.”375 The Armenian response was “a reign 
of terror which lasted two years, during which time many Russian officials were killed by 
the bullets and bombs of Armenians.”376 Dashnak reaction to such action would, in effect, 
open a second front in their terrorist campaign, the first having been established on 
Ottoman soil: “The new policy [an outcome of the General Congress of 1904] was to 
defend and secure Armenian basic rights and freedoms, whether in the realm of the 
Sultan in Turkey or the Tzar in Russia.”377 Their efforts, however, delivered success: the 
edict was eventually repealed by the tsar who softened his approach to Russian 
Armenians,378 at least in his rhetoric if not his policies.  
3. Sasun Insurrection (1904) 
Though hopes were high that a new insurrection in 1904 would succeed where the 
previous Sasun rebellion had failed in 1894, the outcome would be similar. More effort, 
however, had been put into organizing the 1904 uprising379 which may indicate 
improvement in the manner in which the revolutionaries were preparing for combat and 
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could allude to greater support (in the form of those willing to fight with the 
revolutionaries) for their cause. This rebellion was also better funded and better 
equipped.380 It differed further from the 1894 rebellion in that it was led by Antranik,381 
one of the most famous and revered of the early revolutionaries.  
There was, it seems, cause to be hopeful for victory. The revolutionaries hoped to 
make “a strong stand against the government designed at a time when the Porte was 
expected to be involved in complications in Europe.”382 The Dashnaks in Sasun were 
more numerous, better funded, and better armed than the Hunchaks had been in the same 
area in 1895.383 But the odds were clearly not in the favor of the revolutionaries for this 
action: it is estimated that the rebels had approximately 600 fighters with which to fight 
an Ottoman force of tens of thousands.384 The results were devastating despite better 
preparedness: “After a series of long drawn-out fights, during which the peasants and 
their leaders from outside displayed great bravery and inflicted heavey losses on the 
Turkish troops, the rebellion was finally crushed, many mountain villages were destroyed 
and the revolutionists had to retreat to the districts of Moush and Bitlis.”385 Other than 
mention in European news sources and minor grumblings of European diplomatic 
discontent,386 not much came of skirmishes such as the second Sasun Rebellion; 
European intermediation certainly never materialized. Indeed, but for a change in tactics 
that favored terrorism rather than organized resistance in the name of self-defense, the 
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be an exaggeration to say, that all the revolutionary activities of the A.R. Federation put 
together, did not equal, either in magnitude or in actual results, the rebellion of the town 
of Zeitoun in 1895.”387  
4. A Plan to Kill the Sultan (1905) 
There are many who did not see the need for a plan as audacious as assassinating 
the sultan and who were dubious as to the effects it might produce: “This was another of 
the spectacular but futile acts of the Dashnagtzoutune. Its success would not have helped 
the Armenian cause; its failure probably saved our people from greater misfortunes.”388  
The plans to assassinate Sultan Abdulhamid II had been years in the making. The 
leader in this effort, Cristoper Michaelian, had disguised himself and a female accomplice 
in order to travel to the Ottoman Empire to make preparations for the attack.389 Though 
he died in an explosion in Bulgaria on a device being evaluated for the assassination, his 
female companion continued preparations and eventually was involved in carrying out 
the attack which occurred in Solanika at a mosque the Sultan was known to frequent.390 
Despite killing two hundred in the vicinity of the mosque, the explosive laden carriage 
failed to kill the sultan who had delayed momentarily to shake hands with the imam.391 
The significance to be gleaned from this instance, however, is the daring nature of 
the Dashnaks and the lengths to which they would go to achieve their goals. By striking 
at the sultan, the attempt on his life was an endeavor that favored a spectacular act on a 
stage where it could not be ignored but whose chance of success was entirely minimal.  
5. Armeno-Tartar Conflict (1905-7) 
Despite the favorable resolution regarding the disposition of the estates of the 
Armenian Church in the Caucasus, there remained significant anti-Armenian sentiments 
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among Russian officials. Russians were thus able to successfully enlist Azeri support in 
harassing Armenians in the region.392 This alliance was achieved due in large part to long 
standing ethnic and religious cleavages between Armenians and Azeris.393 Other factors 
contributing to the enmity between the two groups were, by now, common sentiments 
among Muslims in both Turkey and the Russian Caucasus: feelings of Muslim superiority 
toward non-Muslims and envy wrought by Armenian financial success.394 
The tensions between the Azerbaijani Turks and Armenians came to a head in 
Baku in 1905 as a result of the encouragement of the governor, Prince Nakashidze, a 
Golitsyn protégé.395 Nakashidze indirectly fostered the violence between the two groups 
mainly by doing nothing, especially when the incident that sparked the violence, an Azeri 
man shot while resisting arrest, could easily have been resolved with the intervention of 
Russian authorities.396 Two groups stood to gain from this conflict: the Russian officials 
in the Caucuses and the Dashnaks. In the case of the former, violence between Azeris and 
Armenians kept these groups occupied where idleness during this period may have let 
their attention drift to the revolutionary movement in Russia, and the implications of 
minorities deriving inspiration therefrom did not sit well with the Tsar.397 Regarding the 
latter, these battles provided the means of championing the Armenian cause once again as 
well as another opportunity to spread their reputation and strengthen their following not 
only in Russia but fortify its efforts in the Ottoman Empire.398 The revolutionaries would 
have their due, however, as these years of conflict came to an end with a Dashnak act of 
terror, the assassination of Nakashidze. 399 
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The conflict that characterized these years is also significant because it 
transcended class differences within the Armenian community. Not only were Armenians 
themselves threatened but their land and property was as well. As most assets of this 
nature were held by the Armenian bourgeoisie, it is significant that the Armenian 
revolutionaries would defend such assets as this implies at best a degree of unity within 
the Armenian community and at least a sense of cooperation. On previous occasions, the 
Dashnak press had been disapproving of the lack of financial support from the 
bourgeoisie and their generally apathetic attitude toward the revolutionary plight.400 As 
there were no civil security or government military forces to protect their interests, the 
bourgeoisie had no choice but to rely on the Dashnaks.401  
6. ARF and CUP: Initial Cooperation 
The early years of the twentieth century were marked by two significant 
developments in the opposition movement to Adbulhamid II’s government. The Young 
Turks and the empire’s various minorities attempted on a few occasions to find common 
ground with which they might unite and more effectively oppose the sultan. The first was 
the First Congress of Ottoman Liberals in 1902 and the second was the Congress of 
Opposition Parties in 1907. 
a. First Congress of Ottoman Liberals (1902)  
The First Congress of Ottoman Liberals, which was held by the Young 
Turks in Paris in 1902, was an attempt to gain the support of the various factions 
“opposed to the Sultan regardless of their ethnic, national, and religious origin.”402 The 
Young Turks sought the Dashnaks for their past radical activity and their increasing 
notoriety and influence among the Armenian population.403 The Young Turks’ views 
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toward minorities was one of inclusion in the empire and equality, but were inconsistent 
with what revolutionaries such as the Dashnaks sought:  
Their solution to the problem of minorities was not based upon the idea of 
self-rule or concessions to their just demands. Rather, they advocated 
equal rights for all through a common citizenship and the establishment of 
a constitutional government with guarantees and safeguards for citizens 
regardless of their minority status. They saw reform as a means to an end, 
the latter being the creation of a viable imperial system.404  
Though the Young Turks did not advocate self-rule for the empire’s 
minorities, the Dashnaks attended the First Congress of Ottoman Liberals in order to 
participate in a greater opposition movement, but also with the intent of influencing the 
Young Turks to alter their views concerning autonomy for the empire’s minorities.405 
The Young Turks were split among themselves as to the question of 
minority autonomy. The more moderate group, led by one of the Sultan’s exiled 
nephews, advocated a degree of autonomy for minorities, while the nationalist group, led 
by Ahmed Reza, promoted the stance that autonomy by its very nature was seditious and 
treasonous.406 As the nationalists gained increasing influence within the Young Turk 
movement, the Dashnaks were forced, for the first time, to consider constitutionalism in 
replacing European intervention as its goal.  
b. Congress of Opposition Parties (1907) 
Despite small Armenian revolutionary victories and their fleeting mention 
in the European press and diplomatic circles, at last the realization was settling into the 
Armenian revolutionary conscience that no European power could be counted on and that 
Russian support was now, after its role in inciting the recent Armeno-Tartar conflict, out 
of the question. Great Britain’s attitude was indicative of general European sentiments: 
“The reasoning of the cabinet was that Britain refused to have her hand forced by 
revolutionary committees, that she did not intend to enlist in a crusade in which she had 
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no interest, and that she must abstain from encouraging the revolutionary leaders by the 
use of severe language to the Turkish government.”407 The Armenian revolutionaries 
were thusly forced to alter their primary strategy and seek allies within the empire. They 
continued to seek such support in the general Hamidian opposition movement led by the 
Young Turks. 
The Dashnaks, in doing their part in the Hamidian opposition movement, 
called for a Congress of Opposition Parties to be held in Paris in 1907. The Committee of 
Union and Progress had agreed to attend, but their involvement was entirely self-serving: 
“…the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress decided to cooperate in order not 
to permit the movement within Turkey to get out of its hands.”408 It is significant that the 
Hunchaks decided not to attend (though they had attended the First Congress of Ottoman 
Liberals in 1902), having “no confidence in the Young Turks.”409 The Dashnaks were on 
their own as representatives of Armenians in the greater Hamidian opposition movement.  
Two very notable developments resulted from the meeting. The first was 
the official declaration that future attempts would be abandoned in persuading the sultan 
to implement article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin or the European powers to petition the 
Ottoman government to this end.410 Instead of working toward Armenian goals of 
autonomy, the Dashnaks agreed to work toward constitutionalism in Turkey and “become 
citizens, with equal rights, of the Ottoman empire.”411 The second was the emergence of 
the Dashnaks as the principal Armenian political party. This party, in their formal 
declarations as a result of this congress, had placed the future of all Armenians in the 
hands of the Young Turks and the broader opposition movement.  
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B. THE RISE OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS  
1. The Young Turk Revolution 
In 1908, the Young Turks came to power in a relatively bloodless revolution on a 
platform that promised imperial constitutionalism; a return to a merit-based government 
administration; a cameral democratic system; political competition based in parties; less 
European meddling within its borders; Ottomanism; and an increase in civil liberties.412 
As Hanioglu points out, however, these promises were largely empty.413 The promises of 
solidarity made to the minority groups that comprised the Hamidian opposition, 
especially in the case of the Armenian revolutionaries, followed a similar path of decline. 
Pro-Hamidian forces attempted a counter coup in 1909 which forced the deposition of 
Abdulhamid II by the CUP as a result of its failure. The empire continued to erode, 
however: Austria-Hungary absorbed Bosnia-Herzegovina; Bulgaria seceded; and Crete 
became incorporated into Greece. The CUP began to realize that retaining their power 
and preserving what remained of the empire would be more difficult than originally 
anticipated. 
2. The Massacres in Cilicia (1909) 
The counter coup in the spring of 1909 briefly promoted a sense of Muslim 
superiority in Cilicia which led, in part, to the massacre of tens of thousands of 
Armenians, as well as hundreds of other Christians.414 Another contributing factor to the 
Muslim ire in the region, was the return of Armenians to the region under the assumption 
that the 1908 Constitutional Revolution meant freedom from previous horrors at the 
hands of Muslims: “The promise of equal status as Ottoman citizens was interpreted by 
Armenians to mean protection of their lives and property and that past injustices would 
be remedied in the form of stolen lands being restored to their rightful owners. Thus 
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many of those who had fled the countryside to the cities or abroad now returned.”415 The 
CUP, however, was largely unable to meet these Armenian expectations outside the 
capital. In fact, the fledgling government had difficulty maintaining control of its forces.  
While the CUP central leadership was located in Istanbul and did in fact employ 
loyal forces to defeat the counter coup, they were not inculpable. Party leaders in the 
capital as well as local leaders were consumed with trying to restore the peace rather than 
protecting victims of violence.416 CUP officials in the region had been recruited from the 
ranks of local notables and thus had a history of violence against Armenians.417 Most 
importantly, however, was the fact that after the violence had subsided, none among the 
perpetrators were held responsible.418  
Despite the massacres in Cilicia, the CUP and the Dashnaks reaffirmed their unity 
in an agreement which re-stated their cooperative relationship; debunked any Armenian 
claim to autonomy; and emphasized the expansion of “privileges” for Armenians in the 
provinces.419 Despite the fact that “the A.R.F. [Dashnaks] emerged as the most powerful 
group representing the Armenian people” their success and popularity had fostered 
dissention among the bourgeoisie and church notables in Istanbul.420 There was also the 
perception among some Armenians that the Dashnaks had promoted unity at the expense 
of the Armenian people: “The A.R.F. expressed so great a faith in the revolution and in 
the unity of the Ottoman Empire that some Armenians accused it of betraying the 
fatherland.”421 The partnership the CUP and Dashnaks had enjoyed at the beginning of 
their relationship had, however, begun to crumble due largely to disunity within the CUP. 
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C. A PEOPLE FORESAKEN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
1. The CUP Changes Direction 
Liberal advocates within the CUP had been marginalized by the rise of 
nationalists at the center of the party in 1910. Of specific note was a new ideology 
proposed by Zia Gokalp in which was hidden a Turkish ethnocentricity that excluded 
minorities: “According to Zia, the ‘Turkish nation’ consists exclusively of Muslim Turks, 
while Greeks, Armenians and Jews may be treated as Turks in citizenship but not in 
nationality.”422 As Zia’s influence grew, so too did the anxiety among Armenians that the 
alliance with the CUP they had so adamantly promoted may involve disastrous 
consequences for Armenians they had not foreseen: “By October, 1910, many Armenians 
came to believe that the C.U.P. had already made plans at a secret meeting in Salonika, 
for the extermination of the Armenian people.”423 But whether the decision was made at 
this congress or the one held in 1911, or later in January 1914 during several clandestine 
meetings424 is a matter of debate. What is known is that by 1912 the Dashnaks had come 
to the realization that the domination of the CUP by its conservative elements and the 
new ideology that was promulgated in 1910 effectively meant the conclusion of any 
thought by the party concerning “inter-religious inclusivity.”425 In May 1912, the 
Dashnaks officially seceded from their alliance with the CUP.426  
The split from the CUP meant the Dashnaks could pursue other allies and they 
picked up where they had left off before the CUP alliance in seeking Great Power 
support, which it found in Russia.427 Russia, along with the Armenian Catholicos (in 
Russia) proposed a plan that would partition the Armenian provinces into two regions “to 
be administered by neutral European inspectors approved by the Porte.”428 For most, this 
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plan represented a means of addressing the inequality and persecution that was again 
becoming prevalent in the provinces at the behest of the CUP.429 Germany had joined 
Russia in sponsoring the plan as well in order to check Russian hegemonic pursuits 
should the plan be implemented.430 The CUP, however, stilted the progress of any such 
plan. 
As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, vast imperial lands were lost: 
almost all of the empire’s European lands were taken and mass migrations resulted.431 
Social conditions continued to worsen as a result of persecution by Muslims, and such 
mistreatment brought Armenian desperation: “…in Bitlis province alone in mid-1913 
Armenians were being murdered at the rate of twenty-seven per month.”432 The efforts of 
Armenian revolutionaries would not alleviate the massacre that would occur in 1915-
1916, however, and this was due in large part to a state whose paranoia became a pretext 
for violence based on fears of enemies both outside and inside its borders. 
2. The Arrival of the Great War 
With the arrival of World War I, the Armenians were again caught between 
competing international powers. As the Dashnaks had a history (however short) of 
cooperation with the young Turks, they were petitioned by the CUP to live up to an 
agreement they had made with them in 1907. This agreement stipulated that the 
Dashnaks, as loyal Ottoman citizens, would incite rebellion against the Russian 
government in the Caucasus.433 The Dashnaks informed the CUP that they would not do 
this specifically, but would fight against Russia with the Ottomans.434 This promise, 
which would not be fulfilled by the Ottoman Armenians, was correctly interpreted by the 
Ottoman authorities to be false and served to heighten the suspicions of Armenian 
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intentions by the CUP.435 In fact, the opposite would eventually occur with the Dashnaks 
in the Caucasus inciting thousands of Armenians from abroad to fight against the 
Ottoman Empire on the Eastern Front.436 The CUP, however, also heard this call to arms 
and exacted retribution on those Dashnaks whose fate they could decide: those within 
reach of the empire. They would call this an act of insurrection and use it to help justify 
the later genocide they would exact on the Armenian population. 
One important development among the Dashnaks in the context of World War I 
was the disingenuous manner in which they called these thousands to fight the Ottomans. 
It was put forth by the Dashnak leadership that Russia had pledged support in the form of 
independence for all Armenians in return for their assistance in the war, a claim that was 
entirely false.437 But the realization that this was not something the Russians had 
promised and was instead the fabrication of prominent Dashnaks, was learned after the 
fact.438 Another significant development during this time must be considered the manner 
in which Caucasian Armenians took action without endorsement or even knowledge of 
these acts by those who would pay the price: “The fact remains that the real 
representatives of the Armenians in Turkey, the Patriarchate and its organs, were never 
consulted by the Caucasian leaders of the Dashnagtzoutune in adopting their policies with 
regard to the Armenian people; yet, the disastrous consequences of these policies were 
suffered by the Armenians in Turkey.”439 Such disconnected intentions among the 
Armenians continued to result in Armenian bloodshed, particularly in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Probably most important among the developments that concerned the Armenians 
in World War I was the paranoia rampant among the Ottomans and the patterns of 
reaction that emerged. Firstly, there was the tendency to consider all Armenians as 
                                                 
435 Ibid., 38. 
436 Ibid. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Ibid.  
439 Ibid., 39.  
 99
insurrectionists (which was not the case) and to hold them all equally responsible for 
rebellious transgressions. Indeed, the violence exacted against Armenians during the First 
World War was often simple, but widespread, typecasting of all Armenians as 
dissidents.440 Secondly, and as the insincere recruitment practices described above reveal, 
reprisals by the Ottoman government that resulted in the tremendous loss of life among 
ordinary Armenians were often the result of the actions of a few. This was especially the 
case among special, irregular pro-Russian formations (notorious for their atrocities that 
mirrored many committed by the Ottomans, though on a much smaller scale) of which 
Armenians were significantly few.441 This deadly pattern of thinking by the Ottoman 
government was rooted in ethnic stereotypes and carried out amidst the backdrop of 
slaughter that would characterize the war itself. It was in this context that opportunity 
was realized by the Ottomans, led by the CUP, to finally resolve the “Armenian 
Question.”  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Dashnaks, in their alliance with the CUP, initially felt they could finally 
cooperate with a major government force with whom their political goals might be 
realized. Previous attempts had been mixed but what had worked in Russia, at least in the 
case of the repeal of the order to seize church lands, was terrorism. It must be noted, 
however, that though terrorism had worked in this case, it was still not a proven tactic in 
producing European state intervention on behalf of Ottoman Armenians. It certainly drew 
their sympathy but did little in terms of productive action against the Ottoman 
government.  
The faith the Dashnaks had in the CUP as they rose to power soon evaporated 
amidst a coup within the CUP and the insistence on a discriminatory ideology among the 
conservatives who became the party’s leaders. Part of the original alliance had been the 
forfeiture of a pursuit of Great Power intervention. The Dashnaks, however, had to resort 
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to this strategy once again with the dissolution of their association with the CUP; there 
was simply nowhere else to turn. But much to the detriment of Ottoman Armenians, 
World War I would provide both an empire that was hypersensitive to challenges to any 
more territorial loss within its borders, as well as an international community concerned 
with their own troops in combat in the Great War.  
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V. CONCLUSION: TURNING TO TERROR 
 It is clear from the preceding review of the Armenian revolutionary movement 
that two very general, but very important observations may be made concerning the 
doctrine which governed Armenian revolutionary activity. The first is that there was a 
widespread disagreement among many groups within the movement that working toward 
autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, rather than complete secession from it, should be 
the main political goal. The second is that the means to accomplish this goal would center 
around demonstrations and attacks aimed at attracting Great Power attention in hopes 
they would intervene on behalf of the Armenians to improve conditions for the ordinary 
provincial Armenian within the Ottoman Empire. Among the most spectacular displays 
of discontent were the terrorist attacks sponsored and carried out by the Dashnaks. This is 
an important part of the answer to the question: Why did Armenian revolutionaries adopt 
terrorism? But it is only part of the answer and there are underlying themes in their 
history that underscore where this tendency originated.  
 The inspiration for the use of violence and self-sacrifice that accompanied the 
choice to use terrorism lie partly in the Armenian cultural revival and the martyrs of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church and its offshoots. The cultural revival of the early nineteenth 
century was promoted by literature that glorified Armenian historical figures. Written in 
the recently revived Armenian language exclusively for (and widely read by) educated 
Armenians, it prompted deep patriotic feelings that were given a purpose by the plight of 
persecuted Ottoman Armenians. The history of martyrdom in the church also promoted 
this nationalist urge and gave no limit to the lengths to which one might go in the service 
of the cause.  
 Inspiration was also derived from past revolutionary activity that had resulted in 
success, specifically, the Zeitun rebellion of 1862 and the Bulgarian revolt. In the context 
of the influence of the latter, however, the Armenians did not constitute a majority in the 
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regions in which they lived.442 Further complications of basing an Armenian revolution 
on the previous Bulgarian one was the fact that, while the Great Powers had intervened in 
the latter, they likely would not in the event of the former, as the region itself had lost 
much of its geostrategic importance.443 Nonetheless, motivation was derived from the 
Bulgarian revolt, however general in nature, due to the success of a minority group 
against the Ottoman Empire.  
Terrorism was also adapted as a result of necessity. Armenian revolutionaries, 
even if they could unite, did not possess the numbers or materiel to challenge the 
Ottoman regime outright.444 Terrorism was a likely choice in advancing Armenian 
political interests. In light of these considerations it is now necessary to examine the 
major differences among various Armenian groups. 
 It seems logical that most prominent Armenians and church officials did not 
advocate terrorism against the Ottoman state. After all, their survival and prestige relied 
upon their continued role in providing both valued services to the state, which often 
involved ensuring order was kept among Armenians, and leadership for the Armenian 
people, which often involved representing the population in the Ottoman government. As 
their livelihood depended on working within the mechanisms of the Ottoman state, 
sponsorship of terrorist activities aimed at subverting it was inconsistent with their self-
preservation as the Armenian elite.445  
The leap to terrorism may seem a logical next step in Ottoman provinces where 
armed self-defense was necessary to protect Armenian people, homes, and lands from 
raiding Muslims and state troops. In considering this point, however, a critical distinction 
must be made between those who did not use terrorism and those that did. The 
Armenakans, for example, remained a local group whose goal was protecting their 
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population against any aggression. It is precisely this manner of thought (simply 
protecting a homeland) on which this party was based. Without significant influence from 
the Caucasian intelligentsia and its Russian populist influence, which included exposure 
to insidious tactics,446 there occurred a stagnation in strategic thought which did not 
occur in the case of Dashnak leadership.447 The adoption of political violence in the case 
of the Armenakans was very discriminate and limited to assassination as a means of 
retribution; theirs was a local fight. Those who were influenced by and drew membership 
from the Caucasian intelligentsia, however, saw the role of Armenian revolutionaries as 
fighters for a greater, nationalist cause that was not contained locally but involved all 
Armenians as a nation.448 The Armenakans relied on limited, local terrorism; on the 
opposite end of the political violence spectrum were the Dashnaks and their acts of 
sensational terrorism.  
As these organizations grew, so too did the diversity of their membership. The 
organization of this membership, however, was critical in the choice of tactics. The 
decentralized nature and disunity that characterized the organization of the Dashnaks, led 
to the adoption of terrorism as a tactic that was “…carried out by regional committees 
interpreting a local consensus…”449 Influence from abroad, particularly Russia, as well 
as the tendency to delegate carrying out activity to the local level, produced conditions 
from which terrorism was a readily adaptable tactic, particularly among the Dashnaks.  
Growth of Armenian revolutionary groups also brought new requirements which 
accommodated the use of terrorism. Those groups who did advocate terrorism needed to 
fund their parties’ activities which frequently involved extorting funds from prominent, 
wealthy Armenians.450 Those who did not give to the cause were often the targets of 
assassination. There was also the prestige factor that drove the need to maintain and 
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incite the supporters of the party.451 This was accomplished by assassinating important 
statesmen or political figures perceived as particularly ruthless by the Armenian 
population.452 These assassinations were very popular among party supporters and 
increased the political stature of a party. Other instances occurred within the party itself. 
When rivals could not come to an agreement, the dispute was often settled with terrorism 
in the form of assassination.453 Having used it against other Armenians and even other 
party members, it was not such a stretch that revolutionaries would use terrorism as a 
tactic against state officials. 
This cycle of violence was perpetuated and kept in constant motion by all three 
players in the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century: the Great Powers, the Armenian 
Revolutionaries, and Ottoman government officials. The Great Powers used the practice 
of censure and public condemnation of the sultan’s activity and often further insisted he 
implement the conditions outlined in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. This frequently 
served to raise the hopes time and again of the revolutionaries. The Armenian 
revolutionaries themselves were spurred by such hopes as the reason they continued to 
resist, demonstrate, and eventually turn to terrorism. The Ottoman sultans and officials in 
Istanbul did their part by continuously doing just enough to appease the great powers but 
continued to commit Armenians to death.  
What deserves considerable attention is the effect of revolutionary activity on 
those it intended to help. These were the destitute Armenians in the provinces who cared 
little of politics or ideologies but mainly in eking out an existence as much removed from 
a Hobbesian one as they could manage. They became unwitting victims in a war in which 
both imperial forces and Armenian revolutionaries rose to fight while those about whom 
they were fighting suffered and died. This is another paradoxical characteristic of the 
Armenian revolutionary story: should Armenians have simply allowed their persecution, 
removal, and deaths without at least fighting for a better life, and in most cases, their own 
lives? Certainly not. At the same time, should campaigns of terror be considered an 
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allowable course of action? In the context of the Ottoman Armenians presented herein, 
the response to that question is less clear. The answer, of course, lies elusively in an 
ambiguous middle ground muddied by distinct historical circumstances and a modern 
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